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The Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) activities, training, and weapons 
after the first decade of this century seem to deviate from the exclusively defense-
oriented policy. This thesis investigates what is driving the evolution of JASDF’s strategy 
behind this behavior and what is the most influential driver of that evolving strategy. This 
thesis first examines the JASDF’s strategic changes in terms of ends, ways, and means, 
and assesses these changes through the concepts of “defensive defense” and “offensive 
defense” to illuminate the JASDF’s strategy. Then, this thesis analyzes four possible 
drivers of the JASDF’s strategic evolution: the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) air 
power, the North Korean threat, the conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics, 
and the offensive nature of the air strategy.  
This thesis argues that the JASDF’s strategy has evolved from the “defensive 
defense” strategy to the “offensive defense” strategy after the early 2000s. In addition, 
even though the evolution of the JASDF’s strategy is a combined result of the four 
independent variables, the strongest driver is the modernization of the PLA’s air power. 
Therefore, the improvement of the relationship between Japan and China is the most 
important factor in curtailing an arms race in Northeast Asia.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) has adhered to the constitutional principle 
of an exclusively defensive security policy since Japan’s defeat in World War II. 
However, recent developments—such as the JSDF’s operation concept change, increases 
in military strength, and weapons purchases—reveal that the strategy of the JSDF is no 
longer exclusively defensive basics. In this context, the strategy of the Japan Air Self-
Defense Force (JASDF) is also arguably evolving in an offensive and aggressive 
direction, as seen by its ends, ways, and means, which are the three elements of strategy. 
Therefore, this thesis addresses the basic research question: What is driving the evolution 
of the JASDF’s strategy and what is the most influential driver?  
In order to address this research question, this research initially focuses on trends 
of the JASDF’s strategy, whether it is offensive or defensive, or a combination. To define 
the JASDF’s strategy, this research analyzes the evolution of JASDF’s strategy in terms 
of ends, ways, and means. Then, this research examines and evaluates the possible 
explanatory factors for the JASDF’s evolution. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Basically, studies on JASDF’s strategy are few. This research has academic 
significance, shedding new light on the JASDF’s strategy, which has been insufficiently 
studied until now. 
First, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) policy and maritime 
strategy have been more closely examined than those of the JASDF due to the 
geopolitical fact that Japan is surrounded by the sea. In addition, the JSDF, which has 
adhered to an exclusively defensive security policy, has practically evaded the 
reinforcement of JASDF and avoided mentioning the JASDF’s strategy. However, 
changes to Japanese national strategy and military strategy are inevitable due to changes 
in the security environment, such as the rise in China’s and North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons development, and also domestic political factors such as the Japanese 
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normalization movement. These changes to national strategy and military strategy 
necessarily encourage Japan to change its sub-elements of JASDF’s strategy.  
This research also has policy significance. This research ultimately analyzes the 
key factors that influence the evolution of JASDF’s strategy. Naturally, there are likely 
several factors affecting the evolution of JASDF’s strategy. Nevertheless, this research 
seeks to find the most significant factor and subsidiary factors in the evolution of 
JASDF’s strategy. Through the result of this analysis, it may be possible to better 
understand the JASDF and the JSDF’s overall priority of strategy establishment. 
Furthermore, this research can be used as a tool to infer the direction of Japanese policy 
making and to establish a strategy for future East Asian relations. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews literatures needed to define JASDF’s strategy and to 
examine the possible drivers of JASDF’s evolving strategy. 
1. Debate on JASDF’s Strategy: Offensive or Defensive? 
To demonstrate the evolution of JASDF’s strategy and define JASDF’s current 
strategy, this research examines how people have recognized JASDF’s strategy so far. 
First of all, the JSDF is definitely not a typical military in that it exists for self-defense 
only. The JSDF sticks to the principle of an exclusively defensive security policy fettered 
by the constitution. Thus, political ends of the JSDF are clearly defensive, and the 
military ends of the JASDF are also defensive. In this context, in his thesis, a major of the 
Republic of Korea Air Force, Youngju Kim argues that JASDF’s strategy is still a 
defensive strategy. He claims the United States and Israel have an offensive air strategy 
emphasizing surprise air attack and preemptive attack.1 By contrast, Kim states that 
Japan pursues a defensive air strategy because it exercises a defense force only when it is 
attacked by a foreign country; based on the principle of an exclusively defensive security 
                                                 
1Youngju Kim, “A Study on the Offensive Character of the People’s Liberation Army’s Air Power: 
Focused on the Analysis of the Operating Concepts and Weapon Systems” (master’s thesis, Korea National 
Defense University, 2015), 17, http://dlps.nanet.go.kr/DlibViewer.do?cn=KDMT1201504522&sysid=nhn.  
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policy, it officially restricts air-to-ground weapon employment and training, and it has 
built an air defense operation based air power.2  
However, some argue that it is difficult to call JASDF’s strategy defensive when 
analyzing the recent changes. “Japan’s air force also has considerable capabilities for 
offensive air superiority operations,” claims Jennifer M. Lind. 3  She argues that, 
considering the operational radius of the F-15J, which is located in Hokkaido and 
Okinawa air bases, JASDF has enough ability to project air power to the Taiwan Strait 
and North Korea.4 In addition, she notes that JASDF’s tanker acquisition has provided 
the basis for offensive air operations by increasing approximately two-fold the 
operational radius of the fighters.5 She further claims that the only limitation of offensive 
air operations is that JASDF did not have air-to-ground precision-guided weapons6; 
however, that will no longer be a problem as the JASDF recently acquired air-to-ground 
precision-guided weapons such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).  
Christopher Hughes also sees that the JASDF’s strategy has evolved to be 
offensive. “Japan’s attachment of importance to the stealth capabilities of the F-35A,” 
Hughes writes, “and its greater associated strengths as an air defence penetration fighter, 
rather than air superiority fighter, suggests a future interest in developing an offensive 
counter-air (OCA) doctrine for the ASDF.”7 He also argues that expanding the ability to 
strike North Korean missile bases and the mainland of China through the air-to-ground 
weapons acquisition is evidence that JASDF is bailing out of the existing defensive 
posture.8  
                                                 
2Kim, “Study on the Offensive Character of the People’s Liberation Army’s Air Power,” 17.  
3Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?: Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” 
International Security 29, no. 1 (2004): 98, http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jlind/files/2013/09/Lind_Pacifism.pdf.  
4Ibid.  
5Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?,” 98. 
6Ibid., 99.  
7Christopher H. Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New 
Dynamism or New Dead End? (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 34.  
8Ibid.  
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However, this previous literature has evaluated the JASDF’s strategy without 
clear definitions of offensive and defensive strategy. We first need to clarify the question 
regarding what are the definitions of offensive and defensive strategy. In order to judge 
the JASDF’s strategy, it is also necessary to determine what should be analyzed in any 
category. 
2. Offensive and Defensive Types of Military Strategy 
It is not easy to distinguish between the offensive and the defensive in the military 
strategy of any country or in the strategy of particular military branch. Above all, the 
concept of strategy has changed continuously in history, and the meaning and category 
have also changed depending on the definer. In addition, it is impossible to determine 
whether the comprehensive strategy is offensive or defensive by only one aspect. First of 
all, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the definitions of the offensive strategy 
and defensive strategy.  
Stephan Fruhling defines strategy as “the instrumental relationship between 
political goals, and the means and ways to achieve them against the opposition of an 
adversary”9 to explain offense and defense in strategy. Like Fruhling’s definition, the 
concept of modern strategy, no matter what the level of strategy, cannot be explained 
without the three elements of strategy: ends, means, and ways. In other words, strategy is 
the top-down flow by which required political ends are converted into military goals, 
operational arts and doctrines are determined to achieve the military goals, and tactics of 
engagement and weapon systems are decided for the operational arts and doctrines.10 
Then, Fruhling said, “offense and defense are distinguished in strategy by their 
purpose: to force one’s will on the enemy, and to undermine his theory of victory, 
respectively.”11 Fruhling argues that the three elements of strategy, which are means 
such as weapon systems, ways such as operational arts, and political ends, should be 
                                                 
9Stephan Fruhling, “Offense and Defense in Strategy,” Comparative Strategy, 28, no. 5 (2009): 463, 
doi:10.1080/01495930903185302. 
10Ibid., 464.  
11Ibid., 472.  
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independently analyzed to determine offensive and defensive of strategy.12 In other 
words, single analysis of only ends, means, or ways independently will not be able to 
show whether the strategy is offensive or defensive. Fruhling easily accounts for the 
reason with examples.  
First, if the offensive and defensive nature of strategy is determined by means 
such as weapon systems, people usually think of a shield as a defensive weapon and a 
sword as an offensive weapon. However, does not a defender use a sword? And, does not 
an attacker use a shield?13 If someone shoots a bow toward the enemy to defend a castle, 
is the bow an offensive weapon or a defensive weapon? Therefore, to determine offensive 
and defensive of strategy by only the weapons possessed themselves is limited; the 
operational concept using the weapon should be analyzed.14  
However, it is also insufficient to analyze offensive and defensive types of 
strategy only in terms of ways such as operational concept. A defender does not always 
take a defensive posture only. Even if someone uses a defensive strategy, the defender 
undertakes aggressive behavior and offensive acts in order to repel the enemy.15 For 
example, if one looks at the Chinese Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) strategy 
concept, China might launch a variety of ballistic missiles and attack the approaching 
enemy by aircraft and battle ship. However, the ultimate goal of the strategy is quite 
defensive, denying the enemy and blocking the enemy’s approach.  
Thus, to judge offensive and defensive of strategy, one must also analyze the 
ultimate ends pursued. In terms of ends, if changing the current status quo by using force 
is the goal, it can be regarded as offensive.16 On the other hand, if maintaining the 
current condition is the goal, it can be regarded as defensive.17 But, if the operations arts 
and weapon systems do not support the characteristic of ends, the strategy cannot be 
                                                 
12Fruhling, “Offense and Defense in Strategy,” 469.  
13Ibid., 465.  
14Ibid., 466. 
15Ibid. 
16Ibid., 467.  
17Ibid.  
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conducted even if the ends are clearly offensive or defensive. Therefore, to define 
offensive and defensive strategy, the comprehensive analysis of ends, means, and ways is 
positively necessary. 
3. Defensive Defense and Offensive Defense 
Can the JASDF’s strategy be distinguished as simply an offensive strategy or 
defensive strategy after analyzing the ends, means, and ways together? As mentioned 
earlier, the goal of the JSDF is defensive according to the principle of an exclusively 
defensive security policy. Nevertheless, recent changes in the JASDF’s weapons system 
acquisition and operational concepts reveal elements of offense within this defensive 
orientation. Hence, to define the JASDF’s strategy, it is useful to divide defensive 
strategy into two variants: “defensive defense” and “offensive defense.” 
In his article, Jaeyeop Kim, a Korean professor, uses concepts of “defensive 
defense” and “offensive defense” to discuss strategy for the Korean military. He first 
distinguishes between offense strategy and defense strategy. According to him, offense 
strategy is to operate a military force for the purpose of active goals, such as seizing or 
occupying another country’s territory and enforcing change of another’s act or will 
according to one’s intention. Accordingly, a country that uses an offense strategy initiates 
military action before the other side and selects the territory of the other side as a space 
for the war, and it essentially pursues a destruction of the status quo. On the other hand, a 
defense strategy intends to operate a military force for the purpose of passive goals, such 
as preserving survival and territory and maintaining one’s own international status and 
rights. Thus, a country with a defense strategy begins military action after an opponent’s 
attack and usually conducts war in one’s own territory, and pursues maintenance of the 
status quo.18  
Kim further argues that the exertion of activeness and initiative, which are 
emphasized for succession of war, is not the exclusive property of the attacker only, and 
the defender also can reduce the effort and cost, and achieve the ultimate victory, through 
                                                 
18Jaeyeop Kim, “In Pursuit of Offensive-Defense Strategy for Korea,” Journal of National Defense 
Studies 56, no.2 (2013): 127–28.  
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freedom of action to choose the time, place, type of operation, etc.19 He divides defense 
strategy into “offensive defense” and “defensive defense,” in accordance with how much 
the state is active and exercising initiative. “Defensive defense” manifests a passive 
aspect to focus on keeping off the enemy attack while waiting at the pre-designated 
area.20 In other words, “defensive defense” is faithful strategy to defense in the pure 
sense of the word.21 On the other hand, “offensive defense” strategy takes an active form 
including aggressive acts, such as counterattack and counteroffensive, and general 
defense that include efforts to impact the military capabilities and will of an invading 
enemy.22 In spite of this activeness and exercising of initiative, “offensive defense” that 
ultimately pursues passive goals (e.g., protecting territory and sovereignty) is 
fundamentally different from an offense strategy that poses a threat in advance to seize 
other countries’ territory or to change others’ actions.  
Kim presents four features to distinguish the differences between “defensive 
defense” and “offensive defense.”  
• First is the objective of war. The objective of “defensive defense” is 
limited to repel an invading enemy out of own border; however, the 
objective of “offensive defense” includes achievement of advantageous 
political and military end-state for postwar national security.  
• Second is the battle space of war. “Defensive defense” strategy conducts 
war definitely in its territory and bears that most of its territory becomes a 
major battlefield; on the other hand, the “offensive defense” strategy 
emphasizes limiting the battlefield within the front or around the 
borderline, and it considers, if necessary, extending or changing the 
battlefield to the enemy’s territory.  
                                                 
19Kim, “Pursuit of Offensive-Defense Strategy for Korea,” 128–29. 




• The third difference is the military effort for counteroffensive. While the 
“defensive defense” strategy conducts defense and counterattack 
gradationally and gradually as time passes in war, the “offensive defense” 
strategy conducts defense and counterattack simultaneously from the early 
stage of war, with some forces defending the enemy’s attack but some 
other forces rapidly counterattacking the enemy’s forces and territory.  
• Fourth is the period of war. “Defensive defense” strategy pursues 
extended war, whereas the “offensive defense” strategy pursues short-term 
war.23 
This thesis is original in applying Kim’s distinction of “defensive defense” and 
“offensive defense” to the Japanese case. In addition to comprehensively analyzing the 
ends, means, and ways of JASDF’s strategy, the thesis examines the objective of military 
action, battle space, the military effort of counteroffensive, and the period of war pursued 
by JASDF, in order to evaluate whether the JASDF’s strategy is still a “defensive defense” 
strategy pursued by the Japanese principle of an exclusively defensive security policy or 
whether it is evolving into an “offensive defense” strategy.  
4. Japanese Military Evolution   
Although few studies focus on the evolution of JASDF’s strategy, several studies 
analyze the recent modernization of JSDF in general, the aspect of JSDF’s strategy 
change, and its factors.  
First, some of the articles analyze the external factors of JSDF’s military 
evolution. Especially, some of articles focus on China as a factor. Christopher W. Hughes 
argues that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan share concern about the development of 
China’s military capabilities, and this concern act as a common factor in each country’s 
military modernization in his article.24 In other words, Hughes points to Chinese military 
                                                 
23Kim, “Pursuit of Offensive-Defense Strategy for Korea,” 129–30.  
24Christopher H. Hughes, “China’s Military Modernization: U.S. Allies and Partners in Northeast 
Asia,” in Strategic Asia 2012–2013: China’s Military Challenge, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner 
(Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 198.  
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modernization as a key factor in the trend of the JSDF. Japanese current concern is China 
trying to maximize its own interest in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Sea 
Lines of Communication (SLOC) of the Asia-Pacific region by extending military 
strength outside of its territory.25 Accordingly, Japan has responded to China’s military 
buildup by revising the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) in 2004 and 2010, 
and changing its defense concept from the “Basic Defense Capability” to the “Dynamic 
Defense Force.”  
Some other articles focus on the North Korean threat factor. In another article, 
Hughes argues that North Korea became a major threat to Japanese security, replacing the 
Soviet Union since the end of Cold War.26 In particular, North Korea fired ballistic 
missiles toward the sea near Japan in the process of testing, and the maximum ranges of 
missiles developed since the early 2000s has increased so significantly that the entire 
territory of Japan is within the range of ballistic missiles of North Korea.27 North Korea 
has been conducting nuclear weapon development since the middle of the 1990s, and 
Japan has recognized that North Korea could pose a serious threat by mounting a nuclear 
weapon on a ballistic missile after securing a nuclear weapon miniaturization 
technology.28 In this article, Hughes concludes that the North Korean threat affects the 
Japanese defense policy by combining with other factors because the level of ballistic 
missile development and nuclear technology is still incomplete.29   
It is noteworthy that the Japanese responses that Hughes discusses—the PAC-3 
missile defense systems deployed around Tokyo from 2006 to 2008, the introduction of 
tankers, and the purchase of air-to-ground precision-guided munitions—are all actions 
taken through the JASDF.30 Hence, here is an example of how the focus in this thesis on 
                                                 
25Hughes, “China’s Military Modernization,” 201.  
26Christopher W. Hughes, “‘Super-sizing” the DPRK Threat: Japan’s Evolving Military Posture and 




30Ibid., 306.    
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changing JASDF strategy will provide a closer look at the nature of the Japanese 
perspective than studies at the more general level.  
Other articles also explain that domestic political factors as well as external 
threats influence the JSDF’s strategy evolution. Arpita Mathur identifies some specific 
domestic factors driving the JSDF’s changing role. First, Mathur claims that Japan has 
pursued its security and regional security through the alliance with the United States until 
now; however, the United States has envisioned a new security role for Japan since the 
2000s.31 The two countries made new common strategic goals, such as Japanese military 
modernization for regional security in 2005.32 In addition, U.S.-Japan cooperation on 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and relaxation of Japan’s longstanding prohibition on 
military exports were both influenced by the U.S. demand for Japanese security policy 
change.33  
Second, the JSDF’s changing role has been influenced by the political resolve of 
the Japanese leader. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is the first prime minister 
to call the JSDF a “military,” and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also constantly strives to 
amend the pacifist constitution, to accept collective self-defense, and to promote the 
JSDF’s foreign deployment.34 This conservative disposition of political leaders and 
strong push for the change of Japanese security policy has had a significant impact on 
changes in the roles and strategies of the JSDF.  
Third, Mathur considers the JSDF’s role change a prerequisite for acquiring the 
seat among the UN Security Council permanent members.35 Japan has pushed ahead 
with the plan for entering the UN Security Council permanent members since 2005. To 
get this authority, Japan has to show a more active and assertive role, such as collective 
self-defense in the regional and international security environment; however, the 
                                                 
31Arpita Mathur, “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces: Towards a Normal Military,” Strategic Analysis 31, 
no. 5 (2007): 728, doi:10.1080/09700160701662260.  
32Ibid. 
33Ibid. 
34Ibid., 729.   
35Ibid., 730. 
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Japanese constitution has limited this role. Therefore, Japan has had to move the JSDF’s 
role change through constitutional amendments and revision of laws, and this Japanese 
ambition actually changed the JSDF’s role.36 
The literature analyzing the modernization and the changing role of the JSDF has 
some limitations. First, deeper research focused on the JASDF is insufficient. Though 
some work analyzes the changes and the factors of the JSDF’s strategy, those deal with 
the entire JSDF and do not deeply cover the evolution of a specific military branch. 
Especially, study focused on the JASDF is essential because air power is the most 
offense-oriented among the ground, maritime, and air domains. So, if Japan, which has 
adhered to the principle of an exclusively defensive security policy, pushes forward to 
change its air strategy, the implication of this change is greater than other cases.  
Second, a sufficient study on the importance or priority of each factor driving the 
JASDF’s strategy evolution and modernization has not been done. Even though the 
factors of JASDF’s strategy evolution have been analyzed in terms of external factors 
such as China and North Korea, and internal factors such as political leadership and 
political ambition, it is not clear what factors play the greatest role in the JASDF’s 
strategy evolution.  
Third, tracing of the JASDF’s strategy change has focused mostly on the side of 
means, such as aircraft and weapons acquisition. As discussed previously in the literature 
review of offensive and defensive strategy, all of the ends, means, and ways should be 
analyzed in order to determine the characteristic of strategy. However, though some 
literature examines the doctrine of the JSDF or base deployment, most of those evaluate 
the offensive evolution of the JASDF’s strategy by the newly introduced aircraft or 
weapon systems. By analyzing only the change of means or capabilities, this work is able 
to determine only the strengthening or weakening of the JASDF’s force rather than to 
determine changes in the offensive or defensive strategies. To verify the JASDF’s 
offensive evolution of strategy, not just the JASDF’s capability buildup, this thesis 
comprehensively analyzes the ends, means, and ways of strategy.  
                                                 
36Mathur, “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces,” 730. 
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Fourth, the JASDF has exhibited additional changes subsequent to the existing 
literature. The JASDF has left more evidence of the strategic changes such as moving an 
additional base to Okinawa or the test flight of the self-developed new generation fighter. 
Thus, through the additional apparent changes of the JASDF, the offensive evolution of 
JASDF can be assessed more clearly. This research pursues a deep investigation of the 
evolution of JASDF’s strategy and its factors by compensating for the limitations of 
existing literature. 
5. Offensive Principle in Air Strategy Theories 
Even though the history of air strategy is not long just as the history of the aircraft 
itself is short, the early air strategy theorists offered a common view with the appearance 
of air power in the battlefield: air power should be employed offensively. These early 
thoughts on air strategy have come of age in many theories, and a lot of air strategy 
theories are still emphasizing the importance of the offensive employment of air power.  
First, Giulio Douhet, an Italian air strategy theorist, paved the way for air strategy 
thought by publishing The Command of the Air in 1921. At the time, the ground battle 
between the two sides during World War I was being conducted as a war of attrition, with 
the frontline bogged down in the total war. In this trend of war, the defender had the 
advantage in comparison with the attacker. However, Douhet thought that air power 
offered a creative way because it can reach the rear of the enemy lines without a 
breakthrough of the frontline through the aircraft, which is no constraint of the sphere of 
activity.37 So, Douhet anticipated that “the new weapon—as we shall see later in this 
study—reverse this situation by magnifying the advantages of offensive and at the same 
time minimizing, if not nullifying, the advantage of the defensive.”38 In addition, he 
argued that “air power is a weapon superlatively adapted to offensive operation, because 
it strikes suddenly and gives the enemy no time to parry the blow by calling up 
                                                 
37Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of the Air 
Force History, 1983), 7–10.  
38Ibid., 15.  
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reinforcement.”39 Under these anticipations, Douhet proposed theories for employing air 
power. First, he argued that command of the air should be seized completely to win the 
war, and for the command of the air, the offensive destruction of the enemy’s aircraft and 
air bases on the ground is more effective than the engagement with the enemy’s aircraft 
in the air.40 And, he asserted that there is no defense practically in the air battle.41 In 
addition, he thought that one should arouse the enemy’s psychological damage through 
the air strike against the enemy’s main industrial facilities and densely populated areas.42  
William Mitchell, an American flight officer during the World War I period, was 
also an early air strategy theorist who stressed the offensive employment of air power. He 
emphasized the importance of strategic bombing like Douhet by claiming that one can 
easily terminate war through the air bombing of the enemy’s vital centers and targets by 
the bombers of the independent air force. He claimed that the air force should entirely 
neutralize or destroy the enemy by directly penetrating the enemy’s nerve center and 
attacking it. However, while Douhet put stress on only strategic bombing and was not 
concerned with the air defense forces, Mitchell classified air forces into three categories: 
the bomber, the fighter, and the attacker, and he pointed out that each category of air 
forces has a certain role. He emphasized the role of the fighter that can destroy the 
enemy’s aircraft and defend friendly forces during the engagement in the air in the 
process of air bombing. But, Mitchell also had no question that penetrating the enemy’s 
territory and conducting strategic bombing are the basis of air strategy.43 
Hugh Trenchard, who is called the father of the British Air Force, also recognized 
that air power should be employed offensively. He asserted that air power should 
continue the offensive operations because the enemy is overwhelmed with psychological 
nervousness by just the appearance of aircraft in the air of battlefield. He proposed four 
principles for employment of air power in his book, The Principles of Air Power on War, 
                                                 
39Douhet, Command of the Air, 16.  
40Ibid., 28–31, 52–55.  
41Ibid.   
42Ibid., 19–24.  
43Changhee Park, On Military Strategy (Seoul: Planetmedia, 2013), 315–321.  
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published in 1945: first, acquiring air superiority and maintaining it continuously; second, 
conducting strategic bombing against the means of production and the transportation 
facilities in the enemy rear; third, protecting supply and reinforcement required for the 
battle; and fourth, attacking the enemy’s supply. Though Trenchard, like Douthet and 
Mitchell, also accepted that strategic bombing is the pivotal role of air power, he stressed 
the balance between the strategic bombing mission and the support mission for the army 
and the navy. However, all of the three early air strategy theorists emphasized the 
offensive employment of air power and had a common view that the air force is 
intrinsically an offensive power in comparison with other forces.44   
The early air strategy theories that emphasized the offensive employment of air 
power and the paralysis of the enemy’s war capability through strategic bombing have 
been continued until today. Especially, John Boyd and John Warden, colonels of the U.S. 
Air Force, enhanced the early air strategy theories and presented air strategy theories that 
stress the strategic paralysis of the enemy’s command and control system. Boyd argued 
that one should disrupt the enemy’s command structure by making intensely fluid and 
threatening situations to which the enemy cannot respond, and Warden argued that one 
should paralyze the enemy’s command line through the parallel attack against the 
enemy’s main strategic center of gravity and operational center of gravity. However, 
these two arguments have a resemblance in terms of the focus of the offensive 
employment of air power.45  
Philip Meilinger, another colonel of the U.S. Air Force, proposed the ten 
essentials of air power in his book, 10 Propositions regarding Air Power. The third 
proposition is that air power is an offensive weapon. He thought that even though defense 
is stronger than offense in the general war theories, this logic cannot be applied in the air, 
where there is no limitation of pass, front lines, and fortifications, and the defensive 
operation in the air cannot be achieved effectively. In addition, the characteristics of the 
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aircraft, including speed, range, flexibility, and ubiquity, give offensive capability to air 
power; thus, the principle that “the best defense is a good offense” is applied to air war.46 
Therefore, from the early air strategy theories to the current air strategy theories, 
air strategy theorists have provided historically the common perspective that air power 
should be employed in fundamentally offensive ways, and air power cannot be used 
effectively if it is employed defensively. These air strategy theories have been reflected in 
the actual employment of air power in the modern warfare, and the air forces in modern 
warfare have been operated offensively by making the best use of the intrinsic merits of 
air power. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This research attempts to evaluate the following three hypotheses:  
• JASDF’s strategy is evolving from “defensive defense” to “offensive 
defense.” 
• The drivers that influence the JASDF’s strategic evolution are external 
factors such as China and North Korea threats, domestic factors such as 
the conservative swing of Japanese politics, and the intrinsically offensive 
nature of air power. 
• Among the aforementioned factors, the strongest driver of the JASDF’s 
strategy evolution is the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA), especially the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).  
Therefore, the dependent variable of this research is the evolution of JASDF’s 
strategy, and the independent variables are the following four: the modernization of the 
PLA, North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development, Japanese 
conservative swing, and the offensive nature of air power.  
As noted in the literature review, there is debate on whether the JASDF’s strategy 
is offensive or defensive. The assumption of the first hypothesis is that JSDF’s strategy is 
basically defensive in the big picture because JSDF’s strategy is based on the principles 
                                                 
46Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power (Montgomery, AL: School of Advanced 
Airpower Studies, 1995), 14–19.  
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of an exclusively defensive security policy, and it pursues self-defense. The strategy of 
the JSDF does not have aggressive goals challenging the status quo, such as invading the 
territory of another country or enforcing change of behavior. Japan has passive goals, 
which are the maintenance of the status quo to protect their territory and sovereignty. 
However, the first hypothesis is that the JASDF has shifted from defensive defense to 
offensive defense to achieve the overall goals of the JSDF. The research of this thesis will 
focus on this question. 
This research will propose and evaluate four factors as the independent variables 
for the JASDF’s strategy evolution. As noted in the literature review, many scholars, 
including Hughes, suggest Chinese and North Korean threats as external factors of the 
JSDF’s evolution. Supporting this assessment, the main threats presented in the NDPG 
are China and North Korea, and the other potential conflict in Northeast Asia with Russia 
and South Korea is rarely emphasized. Therefore, this research focuses on Chinese and 
North Korean threats as two external factors.  
This research also focuses on the conservative swing of Japanese leadership and 
the public as a domestic factor. The conservative swing of Japanese politicians and the 
support of the Japanese people has been a factor pushing an amendment to the pacifist 
constitution, the Self-Defense Forces Law, and other security-related legislation. So, this 
research assumes that the Japanese leadership has provided the validity of legislative 
revision and effort of military normalization through the change of JASDF’s role and the 
evolution of the JASDF’s strategy, considering it is the most aggressive power among the 
military branches. 
The last independent variable is the offensive nature of air power. This factor is 
based on the assumption that one military branch’s strategy is affected by the 
environmental nature and technological characteristics of the branch. Since air strategy 
first appeared, the principle that air power should be employed on offense has 
predominated. As discussed in the last section of the literature review, air strategy 
thinkers have argued that the defensive employment of air power is a waste of forces 
because air power has the least limitation of time, space, speed, and environment, and the 
surprise attack and air bombing are the most effective ways to destroy the enemy’s 
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combat power and morale. These claims have been strengthened by the advent of 
precision munitions, whose effectiveness has been demonstrated in modern war through 
the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War. 
Consequently, many countries increasingly feature the offensive employment of 
air power in their air force doctrines. In contrast, Japan had refrained from aggressive 
employment of air power due to the principle of an exclusively defensive security policy. 
But such a posture is at odds with the lessons of air power operation in modern war and 
the trend of technological development. Thus, this research (specifically, Chapter III) 
examines how much the offensive nature of air power drives the offensive evolution of 
JASDF’s strategy. 
Among these four factors, this research further considers which factor has had the 
greatest impact on the evolution of the JASDF’s strategy. The hypothesis to be tested in 
this thesis is that the modernization of the PLA has exerted the greatest impact on the 
change in strategy of the JASDF. Even though this is an issue that should be verified by 
examining the various aspects of the JASDF’s strategy change in the body of the thesis, 
this research begins with the focus on the PLA’s modernization as the most significant 
driver of the JASDF’s strategy evolution. This approach has been adopted because China 
is the most highlighted threat in the NDPG and the Japanese defense white paper, and 
China has constructed the most qualitatively and quantitatively powerful air force in 
Northeast Asia since entering the 21st century. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research is a single case study focused on the strategy of the JASDF. This 
research uses the “before-after” research design within the single case study method. The 
“before-after” research design divides the single case into two sub-cases of “before” and 
“after” based on specific point of time, and finds the “critical junctures” and key factors 
that divide the single case into two sub-cases.47 In other words, this research divides 
JASDF’s strategy into two periods—that “before” period of “defensive defense” strategy 
                                                 
47Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 166–67.  
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and “after” period of “offensive defense” strategy—and analyzes what are the key factors 
of this strategy change. 
First of all, this research examines the JASDF’s strategy before the early 2000s 
and JASDF’s strategy after the early 2000s to analyze the evolution of JASDF’s strategy, 
which is the dependent variable of this thesis. The reasons for selection of the early 2000s 
as a critical juncture are as follows. First, Japan has changed the peripheral threat 
perception and JSDF’s operational concepts through several modifications of the NDPG 
since 2004. Second, the modernization of the PLA, which started in earnest from the 
middle of the 1990s, began to materialize and accelerate since the early of 2000s. Third, 
North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development capability has been 
extended since the middle of the 2000s. Fourth, the right-wing tendency prime ministers 
including Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe began ruling during this time. Fifth, the 
offensive employment of air power began to be greatly emphasized through the air 
campaigns of the Kosovo War in 1998, the Afghanistan War in 2001, and the Iraq War 
in 2003.  
In the process of analyzing the strategy of the JASDF, this research examines the 
ends, means, and ways of the strategy. As examined in the literature review, a 
comprehensive review of the ends, means, and ways of the strategy is required in order to 
determine the offensive or defensive nature of the strategy. The indicator of the change in 
ends in this research is the change of defense concept in the NDPG, and the indicators of 
the change in ways are air-to-ground attack capability and the debate on preemptive 
attack, the movement and disposition of forces, and aggressive intercept activity in the 
Japan Air Defense Identification Zone (JADIZ). The indicators of the change in means 
are acquisitions of aircraft and weapons, development of a next generation fighter, and 
strengthening of the air defense system.  
Based on these indicators, this research examines how the JASDF’s strategy has 
evolved from a “defensive defense” strategy to an “offensive defense” strategy through 
the four distinctions of “defensive defense” and “offensive defense” presented by 
Jaeyeop Kim. The indicators of each difference of “defensive defense” and “offensive 
defense” are depicted in Figure 1. The change of ends, which is a defense concept change, 
 19
is used to indicate of first difference, the objective of war. The changes of ways (which 
are air-to-ground attack capability and the debate on preemptive attack, the movement 
and disposition of forces, and aggressive intercept activity) and the changes of means 
(which are aircraft, weapons, domestically developed next generation fighters, and air 
defense system) combine to indicate the second, third, and fourth differences (battle 
space of war, effort for counteroffensive, and period of war). 
Figure 1.  Indicators for Defensive Defense and Offensive Defense 
 
Next, this research analyzes how the independent variables—the modernization of 
PLA, North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile threats, Japan’s conservative swing, and 
the offensive nature of air power—affect the offensive evolution of the JASDF’s strategy 
after early 2000s. In addition to this analysis, this research examines how much the 
factors influence the indicators of the ends, means, and ways of the JASDF’s strategy by 
tabulating a scorecard (see Table 1), and seeks each factor’s leverage and priority. 
This research uses a variety of literature for this research process: official 
publications of each country, such as Japanese NDPG and Chinese Defense White Paper, 
researches and articles of experts, government reports, yearbooks and statistical sources 
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related to the military of each country. Moreover, in regard to the latest military 
intelligence, this research refers to reliable newspaper articles and news reports.  
Table 1.   Example Scorecard for JASDF’s Strategy Evolution Factors 
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Modernization S W S … … … … … 
N.K. 
Nuclear/Missile S S W … … … … … 
Conservative 
Swing S S … … … … … … 
Air Power 
Nature S … … … … … … … 
S: Strong or W: Weak  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. In the introduction, this thesis presents 
the research question, hypothesis, significance, and literature review related to offensive 
and defensive of strategy and the JSDF’s evolution. 
In the second chapter, this thesis examines how the JASDF’s strategy has evolved. 
First, the chapter determines the JASDF’s strategy before the early 2000s by examining 
the ends, means, and ways of the JASDF’s strategy. Next, it analyzes the changes of the 
JASDF after the early 2000s, examining the indicators of the each component of strategy, 
using the same measures of ends, means, and ways. Finally, this chapter evaluates the 
current strategy of the JASDF in terms of the distinctions between “defensive defense” 
and “offensive defense.” 
In the third chapter, this thesis analyzes each independent variable, to evaluate 
which have had the most influence in changing the JASDF’s strategy. As explained in the 
previous hypotheses part, the independent variables of the JASDF’s strategic evolution to 
be verified in this research are modernization of the PLA, North Korea’s nuclear and 
ballistic missile threats, the conservative swing of the Japanese leadership and public, and 
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the offensive nature of air power. This chapter examines how each independent variable 
has influenced the evolution of the JASDF’s strategy. 
The fourth chapter judges how much the independent variables have affected each 
indicator of the dependent variable by using the scorecard, which is proposed in the 
research design part. This chapter finally determines what independent variable is the 
most significant driver of the JASDF’s strategic evolution. In addition, through the results 
of research, this chapter defines the present pattern and anticipates the future direction of 
the JASDF’s strategy. 
The concluding chapter summarizes the contents of the research, evaluates the 
hypotheses, and proposes the implications for Northeast Asian security that are inferred 
from this study.  
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II. EVOLUTION OF JASDF’S STRATEGY 
A. BACKGROUND OF JSDF’S STRATEGY 
After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the basic direction and policy stance of the 
General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ), which 
was organized as the occupying government in Japan, were “demilitarization” and 
“democratization.”48 For the two basic policy directions, the GHQ first carried out 
amendment of the Japanese constitution, and the new Japanese constitution was 
completed on the principle of “the sovereignty of people,” “the symbol emperor system,” 
“abandonment of the right of belligerency and the armed forces under permanent 
pacifism,” and “guarantee of fundamental human rights.” The new constitution was 
published on April 17, 1946.49 
In the constitution, Article 9 set the Japanese defense policy direction after the 
war. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 is “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes,” and 
paragraph 2 is “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”50 Japan gained the new constitution 
called the “pacific constitution” by renouncing prosecution of war and possession of 
armed forces and repudiating the right of belligerency through Article 9. This new 
constitution has prescribed not only the Japanese security and defense policy but also 
every feature of state development, and affected not only the East Asian security but also 
the entire international security environment.  
                                                 
48Jangmin Kim, “A Study on the Japan’s Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Focusing on ‘the Active 
Defense’ Policy” (doctoral dissertation, Hanyang University, 2008), 21.  
49Ibid., 22.  
50“Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution,” Library of Congress, accessed August 1, 2016, 
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Despite the pacific constitution, the GHQ felt the necessity of Japan’s self-defense 
capability due to the beginning of the Cold War, and the Japanese government 
established the “National Police Reserve,” consisting of 75,000 men, in December 
1950.51 After that, the National Police Reserve reinforced the organization and the 
fighting power, and Japan launched the “National Security Board” and established the 
“National Security Force,” which was the forerunner of the Japan Ground Self-Defense 
Force (JGSDF), and the “Coastal Safety Force,” which was the forerunner of the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force, in August 1, 1952.52 Since the implementation of the 
Establishment of Defense Agency Act and the Self-Defense Force Act in July 1, 1954, 
the National Security Board was reorganized as the “Defense Agency,” and the JSDF was 
inaugurated with the same land, sea, and air forces as today, by establishing the JGSDF, 
JMSDF, and JASDF.53 
Even though it is difficult to define the JSDF’s formal strategy because the JSDF 
is not the formal military force under the pacific constitution, the principle of an 
exclusively defense-oriented policy formulated in the 1970s is regarded as the Japanese 
formal defense strategy. As Yasuhiro Nakasone’s, head of the Defense Agency in 1970, 
argument, the independent defense theory and the continuous increase of the defense 
force and the budget, received criticism—both internally and externally—that there was a 
rebirth of Japanese militarism, Japan first published a defense white paper in 1971 and 
formally communicated the defense strategy to reduce this criticism.54 According to 
Japan’s defense posture concept presented by the Defense Agency at the time, the 
Defense Agency revealed that Japan would stick to the defensive strategy by exercising 
its right to self-defense as a sovereign country if there were an invasion by foreign 
powers. 55  After Japan stipulated that “the principle object of Japan’s defense is 
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exclusively defense-oriented policy” in the defense white paper of 1971, Japan has been 
using the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy as the basic military 
strategy. 56  According to the Japanese defense white paper, the principle of an 
exclusively defense-oriented policy sought by the JSDF is as follows.  
The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used 
only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force 
is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense 
capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the 
minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters 
refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the 
spirit of the Constitution.57  
The meaning of the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy can be 
interpreted as follows. First, the JSDF does not carry out a preemptive attack before an 
enemy’s attack. Second, the JSDF uses a necessary minimum physical force for self-
defense to defend against an enemy’s attack. Third, the JSDF is not equipped with 
offensive strategic weapons beyond the concept of self-defense. Fourth, the JSDF sticks 
to a defensive defense strategy based on the pacific constitution. This principle of an 
exclusively defense-oriented policy has been the keynote of the JSDF’s policy and 
strategy with the pacific constitution.58 
B. JASDF’S STRATEGY BEFORE THE EARLY 2000S 
The JSDF’s strategy based on the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented 
policy has been reflected in the JASDF’s strategy and policy as it is. Although the 
majority of air strategy theorists have historically argued that the basic operational 
principle of air power is the offensive operation,59 the JASDF has been operating its air 
power defensively in accordance with the pacific constitution and the principle of an 
exclusively defense-oriented policy. 
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First, according to this principle and the “Basic Defense Capability” concept in 
the 1976 and 1995 NDPG,60 which emphasize minimum-necessary forces, the JASDF’s 
strategic ends prior to the 2000s were absolutely defensive in nature—to defend against 
the enemy invading the Japanese mainland through the air. The “Basic Defense 
Capability” concept, which was first applied in the 1976 NDPG and maintained without 
significant changes until the 1995 NDPG, means that the JSDF possesses the appropriate 
and efficient defense capability to prevent an enemy’s attack, but nuclear deterrence 
relies on the alliance with the United States.61 It also means that the JSDF seeks early 
termination of any situation by responding immediately to an enemy’s indirect attack and 
by repelling as soon as possible an enemy’s direct attack by operating the defense forces 
synthetically and systematically.62 For the “Basic Defense Capability,” the 1976 NDPG 
states that the JASDF should have aircraft control, warning, and surveillance capability 
in the Japanese airspace; the response ability through fighters and air defense systems 
against illegal air intrusion; and air support, search, transport, and early warning 
capability against an enemy’s air assault and landing operation.63 This “Basic Defense 
Capability” concept and the role of the JASDF were reflected in the 1995 NDPG without 
major changes. From the “Basic Defense Capability” concept in the 1976 and 1995 
NDPG, the JASDF’s strategic ends until the 1990s were quite limited to the passive goal 
of the mainland’s defense, confined to the detection and warning against indirect and 
direct intrusion through the Japanese airspace and repelling it.  
In terms of strategic ways, the air power mission can be classified into the air-to-
air mission and the air-to-ground mission in accordance with the type of engagement 
target and the location of the target.64 The air-to-air mission is the aerial fight mission 
against the enemy’s fighter or supporting aircraft, and it is more defensive than offensive 
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in nature because its purpose is primarily limited to attacks on the enemy’s aircraft.65 On 
the other hand, the air-to-ground mission is quite offensive because it mainly equips 
bombs or missiles and penetrates into the near border or the enemy’s territory and strikes 
directly in the deep area.66  
Due to the these characteristics, the JASDF completely excluded air-to-ground 
attacks and preemptive air strikes, and focused on a mission to intercept the approaching 
enemy’s air power within Japanese airspace passively. Air-to-ground capability was 
regarded as conflicting with the pacific constitution and the principle of an exclusively 
defense-oriented policy, so it had exploited only the air-to-air mission and air defense 
system as the strategic ways to defend against the enemy’s intrusion. Certain limited air-
to-ground capability possessed by the JASDF was merely the air-to-ground support 
operation concept to fight off the enemy’s approach and landing operation.  
In addition, a country that uses air power as a means of preemptive attack has the 
offensive air strategy in terms of desire to achieve the effect of sudden attack and to 
secure the initiative.67 However, the JASDF had thoroughly denied the preemptive use 
of air power to avoid an offensive air operation, and it had confined air power to being a 
means of confrontation against the enemy that had already invaded the Japanese territory.  
In terms of strategic means, the JASDF did not possess the air-to-ground mission 
fighter and weapon, aerial refueling tanks supporting long-range projection capability 
during this period. As stated previously, in strategic ways, the JASDF had completely 
excluded the air-to-ground capability before the 2000s. Thus, the JASDF’s fighters had 
highly limited air-to-ground capability before 2000 when F-2 fighters entered service. 
The JASDF had 160 F-15J/DJ, 40 F-1, and 70 F-4EJ in 1999.68 Among these fighters, 
the F-15J was the air-to-air mission fighter that was designed for only air-to-air operation. 
Furthermore, even though some of the F-1 fighters and F-4EJ fighters could support the 
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air-to-ground mission, it was only for Close Air Support (CAS) operation by using 
machine guns or small bombs against an enemy’s landing on the Japanese mainland, not 
for the precision strategic bombing. Additionally, the JASDF did not possess the 
precision air-to-ground bomb and the air-to-ground missile, which can destroy the 
enemy’s high payoff targets (HPT). Most of the JASDF’s weapons were defensive 
weapons to repel the enemy’s approach. Among these were the AAM-1, AAM-3, AIM-7, 
and AIM-9 air-to-air missiles for shooting down the enemy’s aircraft intruding the 
airspace, ASM-1 and ASM-2 air-to-ship missiles for sinking the enemy’s ship invading 
the sea, and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) 
surface-to-air missiles.69 The JASDF also did not possess the long-distance power 
projection means such as the aerial tanker and the long-range cargo until the 1990s. 
Therefore, also from the characteristics of the strategic means, the JASDF strategy had 
been quite limited to the defensive strategy that defends the airspace within the mainland 
until the 1990s.  
C. CHANGE OF ENDS AND DEFENSE CONCEPT 
The Japanese defense posture concept has changed through three amendments of 
the NDPG in 2004, 2010, and 2013. The first security and defense objective in the 2004 
NDPG was “to prevent any threat from reaching Japan, and in the event that it does, repel 
it and minimize any damage,” which was similar to the objective of the former NDPGs.70 
However, added to this, the 2004 NDPG specified the second objective “to improve the 
international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach 
Japan in the first place.”71 Thus, though the defense concept in the 2004 NDPG 
maintained the effective aspects of the former “Basic Defense Capability” concept, it 
stressed independent and proactive activities to cope with various threats and 
international security situations.72 Moreover, by specifying not only preventing and 
repelling the enemy’s penetration but also reducing the enemy’s opportunity to access 
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Japan, the 2004 NDPG alluded to the possibility of more active and preemptive action 
than before.73 In other words, Japan’s security and defense strategic ends transcended the 
traditional mainland defense goal as of the 2004 NDPG, and reflected Japan’s will to be 
involved in and engaging actively regional and international security matters, and to raise 
the political status of Japan.  
In addition, in the 2010 NDPG, the “Basic Defense Capability” concept was 
changed to the “Dynamic Defense Force” concept.74 According to the 2010 NDPG, it 
stressed that the JSDF should possess not only the specific level of defense force but also 
the reliable deterrence capability and the defense capability that can contribute to the 
stabilization of the security around Japan because the warning time of contingency was 
shortened due to the increase in the surrounding threat and the development of military 
technology.75 For this objective, the 2010 NDPG also emphasized that the JSDF should 
improve the level of equipment, increase the operational tempo, and possess dynamic 
deterrence power and reflect these changes to operation.76 By reflecting these elements, 
Japan transitioned from the former “Basic Defense Capability” concept to the developed 
“Dynamic Defense Force” concept, which sought to possess more dynamic and active 
capacity and more flexible, expedited, and mobile strategy based on advanced military 
technology.77  
The 2013 NDPG went one step further and adopted the “Dynamic Joint Defense 
Force” concept to build a joint force that can flexibly respond to various security 
threats.78 In migrating from the “Dynamic Defense Force” concept to the “Dynamic 
Joint Defense Force” concept, the 2013 NDPG emphasizes the integrated operational 
capability of the JSDF’s land, sea, and air power and focuses on the mobile and rapid 
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deployment of the JSDF for each security environment and condition.79 It also aims to 
strengthen the deterrence power and the response capability against the surrounding 
threat by the qualitative and quantitative development of the JASDF and the enhancement 
of joint operation capability.80 
The strategic ends and the policy goal of each military branch are set according to 
the military strategy and defense policy of the country. Thus, from the changes of the 
JSDF’s defense concept through the amendments of the NDPG, the ends of JASDF’s 
strategy have also gradually relinquished the previous passive and defensive mainland 
defense oriented objectives, instead aiming the JASDF to pursue active, rapid, and 
flexible response against a variety of threats, based on advanced technology and the 
weapon systems to secure the favored and stable political and military status.  
D. CHANGE OF WAYS 
This section examines the changes in JASDF’s strategic ways in terms of the air-
to-ground attack capability and debate of preemptive attack, movement and disposition of 
forces, and the intercept operation in JADIZ.   
1. Air-to-Ground Attack Capability and Debate of Preemptive Attack 
The most significant change from the former absolutely defensive strategy, which 
was based on the pacific constitution and the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented 
policy, was the acquisition entering the 2000s of long-distance strike capability through 
the acceptance of the air-to-ground operation concept and the emergence of the debate on 
preemptive strike. As discussed in the previous section, even though the JASDF had 
some air-to-ground support ability by F-1 and F-4 fighters before the 2000s, this air-to-
ground capability was the only level for blocking the enemy’s landing or access to the 
mainland and supporting ground and maritime forces through the machine gun and small 
general-purpose bombs. However, Japan began to have a precision strike capability by 
equipping and upgrading the JDAM precision-guided bomb ability to F-2 fighter since 
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2003 and also began to introduce the JDAM kit for that capability.81 In addition, 
selecting the F-35 stealth fighter, which can conduct precision bombing after covert 
infiltration, also strengthened the JASDF’s air-to-ground capability. The JASDF 
conducted its first live bombing exercise by F-2 fighter in 2007,82 and it accomplished 
the JDAM bombing demonstration of F-2 fighter at the JSDF’s ceremony in 2013. So, the 
JASDF is publicly strengthening the air-to-ground capability, which was considered 
contrary to the nature of the JSDF and excluded before.83  
Furthermore, the debate on preemptive strike began to occur in Japan since the 
2000s with the expansion of the air-to-ground capability. Although Japan does not yet 
formally acknowledge the possibility, the Japanese hardliners have argued to secure 
preemptive attack capability to be able to respond whenever North Korea conducts 
nuclear weapon or ballistic missile tests.84 In 2003, Shigeru Ishiba, the minister of 
defense at the time, mentioned that there is a need to consider possession of strike 
capability against the North Korean missile bases,85 and the Japanese ruling party 
lawmakers argued that Japan should have preemptive strike ability at the self-defense 
level while they prepared a new defense policy.86 At the Committee on Security of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in March 24, 2016, Imazu Hiroshi, the chairman of 
Research Commission on Security of LDP, argued that it is necessary to discuss plans for 
striking North Korean bases because North Korea can fire several missiles 
simultaneously, and other lawmakers were in favor of a discussion on pre-emptive strike 
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plans.87 General Nakatani, Japanese Minister of Defense, supported the argument by 
saying that attacking an enemy’s missiles is self-defense.88 Furthermore, the amended 
Armed Attack Situation Response Act, which has been implemented since March 29, 
2016, posed the possibility of a preemptive attack by specifying that Japan can exercise 
the right of collective self-defense even before an enemy’s attack if there is an obvious 
threat.89  Considering that most pre-emptive attacks in modern warfare have been 
conducted by missiles or air strikes, the JASDF would have a leading role in any 
preemptive strike on nuclear and missile threats to Japan.  
2. Movement and Disposition of Forces 
Entering the 2000s, the JASDF’s missions in the Southwest region of Japan 
including the East China Sea rapidly increased, and the JASDF needed to strengthen 
additional air power in Okinawa. Thus, the JASDF established the 9th fighter wing in 
Okinawa Naha base in 2015 by supplementing one fighter squadron (304th Fighter 
Squadron) with another existing fighter squadron (204th Fighter Squadron) and 
abolishing the 83rd Air Wing as depicted in Figure 2.  
Figure 2.  Disposition Plan of JASDF’s Fighter Squadrons90 
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This was the first new fighter wing establishment since the 8th fighter wing 
establishment in 1964.91 This movement is to deploy the forces in the direction of the 
East China Sea and to pursue more rapid and aggressive intercept missions. The JASDF 
is trying to achieve air superiority, effective deterrence power, and flexible response 
against the various threats in the region through the change.92 
3. Intercept Operation in JADIZ 
The JASDF has been strengthening its interception activities in the JADIZ. The 
JASDF’s scramble mission, which is a warning and emergency takeoff mission of the air 
force for identifying and intercepting against intrusion of the territorial airspace, had 
rapidly decreased after end of Cold War. Most of the JASDF’s scramble missions of the 
Cold War period were a response to the Soviet tracks. The highest number of these 
scramble missions was recorded in 1984 and began to decline sharply since just before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, as shown in Figure 3.93  
Figure 3.  Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War94 
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However, missions began to increase again since 2003 and increased six times 
from 158 cases in 2003 to 943 cases in 2014.95 The 943 scramble missions in 2014 were 
almost the same number of 944 scramble missions in 1984. Through the defense white 
paper, Japan has stressed that it will continue to restrict itself to intercept activity against 
invading of airspace in accordance with the international law and the Self-Defense Force 
Law in the situation that the conflict with China is amplifying in the East China Sea.96 
E. CHANGE OF MEANS 
This section examines the changes in JASDF’s strategic means in terms of 
aircrafts, air weapons, domestically developed fighters, and air defense system.   
1. Type of Aircraft 
Entering the 2000s, the JASD’s composition of aircraft type has changed from the 
air-to-air intercept fighter oriented composition to the variety of aircraft type composition 
including the air-to-air fighter, the air-to-ground fighter, and supporting aircraft by 
introducing various mission aircraft, and the JASDF has constructed the means that can 
realize the “Joint Dynamic Defense Force” concept. First, examining the fighter, the 
JASDF weeded out F-1 fighters and deployed domestically developed F-2 fighters 
entering the 2000s, and the Japanese government announced acquisition of next-
generation F-35 stealth fighters in 2011. The JASDF developed the F-2, which is multi-
role fighter similar to the F-16, by technical transfer method from the United States, and 
the F-2 entered service in 2000, and 92 F-2 fighters are being operated now.97 The F-2 is 
designed to be equipped with the machine gun, the general-purpose bomb, the cluster 
bomb, the rocket gun, etc. The operating system of the JDAM precision-guided bomb 
attached to the F-2 since 2003 made it possible to conduct precision-guided attacks.98 In 
addition, in 2017 Japan is scheduled to begin introducing a total of 42 F-35s, one of the 
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newest and the highest performance fighters in the world. Above all, the combination of 
the covert penetration capability based on stealth and the air-to-ground precision strike 
capability of the F-35 is regarded as a strategic asset that can destroy or neutralize key 
targets in its neighbors beyond the traditional principles of exclusively defense-oriented 
policy.99  
Moreover, the JASDF’s formal air-to-air intercept mission has become more 
varied by developing, purchasing, and deploying the E-767 Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS), KC-767 air-to-air tankers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 
and domestically developed C-2 large strategic cargo. The JASDF introduced four E-767 
AWACS by direct purchase method from 1998 to 2000, operating them since May 2000. 
Also, the JASDF decided to upgrade the avionics of the E767 in May 2006, and the 
program is now progressing.100 Furthermore, the JASDF decided to purchase four E-2D 
hawkeye new Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft in 2015.101  
The JASDF contracted to purchase KC-767 aerial refueling tanker with Boeing in 
2003 and deployed four KC-767s from 2008 to 2010.102 Through the purchasing of 
tankers, the JASDF possesses rapid and flexible response capability against the situation 
of an enemy’s intrusion in the East China Sea by increasing the endurance time of 
interceptors such as the F-15J. Moreover, the JASDF now has long-distance power 
projection capability through the air-refuel operation by tankers. As General Makatani, 
Minister of Defense, publicly announced in October 2015, Japan will introduce the KC-
46 Pegasus, making Japan the first foreign country for which the United States is now 
developing the next tanker. The JASDF’s long-distance power projection capability and 
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the endurance time of aircrafts will be continuously increased through the strengthening 
of aerial refueling forces.103 
Japan began to carry forward the small air-launched UAV, named TACOM, 
development program by the Ministry of Defense since 2004, and the development and 
production is now progressing, such as starting test flights sponsored by JASDF since 
2008.104 Though the TACOM is being developed for the purpose of surveillance and 
early warning against threats invading the Japanese territory, it can be modified as a 
cruise missile and used for assault or air strike because TACOM is designed as an air-
launched multi-purpose stealth UAV.105 In addition, Japan decided to introduce the RQ-
4 Global Hawk UAV in 2014, and the U.S. Department of State permitted the sale of 
three RQ-4s to Japan in November 2015.106 Through this strengthening of UAV forces, 
the JASDF pursues expeditious and active prevention and repelling against an intruding 
threat by expanding detection and early warning range surrounding the mainland.  
Furthermore, Japan began to develop the C-2 long-distance cargo reaching 
10,000 km of cruising radius since 2007 and succeeded in the first test flight in 2010. The 
C-2 was first delivered to the Ministry of Defense on June 30, 2016, and ten C-2s will 
enter service by 2018.107 The JASDF now possesses long-distance power projection 
capability that can transport and deploy the JSDF outside of the mainland through the 
long-distance cargo.  
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2. Type of Weapon 
The characteristics of the JASDF’s air weapon also changed from the airspace and 
near sea defense oriented weapons, such as air-to-air missiles and air-to-surface missiles, 
to various weapons that can back up the strategic goals and operation concept. Such 
weapons include the JDAM precision guided bomb.  
Japan has been using various domestically developed air weapons based on 
developed technology. Japan developed and deployed the AAM-4, similar to the U.S. 
AIM-120, and AAM-5; similar to the U.S. AIM-9, for air-to-air weapon; and the ASM-1 
and ASM-2 air-to-ship missiles for defending the enemy’s maritime penetration. As 
previously stated, these JASDF’s air-to-air and air-to-ship weapons are forced to take a 
defensive nature due to their characteristics.  
However, the JASDF saw the necessity of active counter-attack capability against 
a variety of threats rising in neighboring countries since entering the 2000s; the JASDF 
decided to introduce the JDAM air-to-ground precision guided bomb kits in 2003 and 
acquired and deployed it.108 The JASDF will use the acquired JDAM kit by mounting in 
it the 500 lb general-purpose bomb that the JASDF already holds. The JASDF thereby 
can conduct precision strikes to an enemy’s ground target unlike its previous operational 
concept. However, to use JDAM, the fighter and the pilot have to penetrate into the 
enemy’s territory and drop the bomb directly above the target because JDAM is guided 
by a Global Positioning System (GPS) in the process of fall after the pilot’s airdrop. This 
is unlike the cruise missile, which can be launched at its own territory by standoff method. 
Therefore, the acquisition of the JDAM may signal that the battlefield pursued by the 
JASDF quite escaped from the mainland and expanded to the border or the enemy’s 
territory. However, since the explosion power of 500 lb general-purpose bomb is a little 
limited depending on the target, it is worth noting whether the JASDF introduces the 
greater explosive power bomb that can mount the JDAM kit or a new kind of air weapon 
system.  
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3. Development of Next Generation Fighters 
Japan is developing autonomously a fifth-generation fighter, named ATD-X 
Shinshin. Japan asked the United States to sell it the F-22 fighter in 2007, but the United 
States refused, and so Japan has felt the necessity of developing its own fifth-generation 
fighter.109 So, Japan embarked on full-scale development of the new fighter by reflecting 
it in the budget in 2009, and Japan became the fourth nation to test-fly a homegrown 
stealth fighter with a successful test-flight of the self-developed F-22 on April 22, 
2016.110 Shinshin is equipped with stealth, a thrust vectoring nozzle, AESA radar, and a 
variety of advanced avionics, which are mounted in the most advanced fifth-generation 
fighters such as the F-22 and F-35. These features are intended to enable the fighter to 
secure air-superiority in the near-sea area, and it will replace the F-15J and F-2 in the 
future.111  
Japan’s Ministry of Defense also released data on the vision of the future fighter 
after the fifth-generation fighter on its website in August 2010. Through this, Japan 
presented its own concept for the sixth-generation fighter independent of other aviation-
developed countries such as the United States, Russia, and China. According to the data 
published by the Ministry of Defense, the Japanese sixth-generation fighter called “i3” 
will possess advanced stealth capability and anti-stealth capability, cloud-shooting 
technique, 112  advanced radar, a directed energy weapon, and advanced electronic 
warfare capability, etc.113 Thus, Japan has shown a willingness to acquire tactical and 
strategic advantage over its neighbors’ next-generation fighters developed in the future. 
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4. Air Defense System 
To respond against missile threats in the Northeast Asia region, which have been 
increasing since the late 1990s, Japan developed the BMD system since 2004 and agreed 
to secure the advanced ballistic missile interceptors with the United States by amending 
the JSDF Act in 2005.114 Japan began to deploy PAC-3 missiles over the mainland of 
Japan since 2007. Unlike the PAC-2 missile system that optimized for intercepting the 
aircraft by mounting the airburst proximity fuse, the PAC-3 missile system is the terminal 
phase surface-to-air defense system optimized for intercepting the ballistic missile or the 
cruise missile by using the hit-to-kill warhead. 115  In addition, the JASDF has 
strengthened the sensor of the air defense system by introducing the new FPS-5 radar and 
upgrading FPS-3 radar since 2006 to increase surveillance range and to detect ballistic 
missile threats even earlier.116 After that, due to the persistence of surrounding missile 
threats, the JASDF additionally deployed the PAC-3 intercept missile in the vicinity of 
Tokyo and Okinawa in March 2012.117  
F. ASSESSMENT  
According to the previously mentioned JASDF strategic changes, the goals of the 
JASDF have evolved aggressively and actively from simply repelling an enemy’s 
approach in the territory to ensuring favorable political and military situations related to 
national security. Especially, as the JSDF’s defense concept changed from the former 
“Basic Defense Capability” to the “Dynamic Defense Force” concept and then to the 
“Dynamic Joint Defense Force” concept, the JASDF’s strategic ends also evolved from 
mainland defense by the essential-minimum defense force to achieving a favored political 
and military situation by not only early repelling against intruding threats but also 
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deterrence through the flexible, rapid, and active response and securing of the advanced 
force.  
Second, the battlefield space and engagement zone has extended from Japan’s 
own territory to the border or even within the enemy’s territory. Entering the 2000s, the 
JASDF began to acquire air-to-ground capability, which was entirely excluded before, 
and it started to introduce air-to-ground fighters and weapons. Possession of the air-to-
ground capability and consideration of preemptive attack have the purpose of extension 
of battlefield to the enemy’s territory by migrating from the principle of an exclusively 
defense-oriented policy. Furthermore, the acquisition of F-35 fighters, the development 
of the next-generation fighters, and the securing of the aerial refueling tanker and the 
long-distance cargo strengthened the long-range power projection capability and the 
covert penetration ability.  
Third, the JASDF previously focused on defense against an enemy’s attack; 
however, it now pursues defense and counterattack simultaneously and even preemptive 
strike capability for when an enemy’s attack is certain. The JASDF strengthened the air-
to-ground capability and the counter-strike ability by securing the stealth fighter, the air-
to-ground weapons system, and aerial tankers at the same time while increasing the 
mainland defense capability by strengthening intercept activity against neighboring 
countries’ aircraft and building up the air defense system. Moreover, Japan prepared 
grounds to support preemptive strikes that can be carried out in the case of identifying an 
obvious fatal threat through the amendment of the Armed Attack Situation Response Act.  
Fourth, the duration of war pursued by the JASDF has changed from long war, 
consuming enemy forces by concentrating defense, to short-term war, suppressing the 
enemy rapidly and proactively. For this concept, the JASDF relocated one F-15J 
squadron to Okinawa and conducted active intercept operations. The JASDF also 
acquired AWACS and new air defense radar to strengthen the early detection and 
warning ability and increased the long-distance preemptive strike capability and the 
counter-attack capability. 
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Therefore, when seeing these four characteristics of strategic evolution, the 
JASDF’s strategy has been changed from its previous “defensive defense” strategy to an 
“offensive defense” strategy since the early 2000s. In summary, see the Table 2. 
Table 2.   JASDF’s Strategy Evolution after the Early 2000s 
JASDF’s Strategy before the Early 2000s : Defensive Defense 
- Objective of War: Defense of the mainland and airspace by detecting, warning, and 
repelling enemy 
- Battle Space: Limited to the mainland 
- Effort of Counter Offensive: Only defense 
- Period of War: Delayed due to the exclusively defensive posture  
↓ ↓ ↓ 






























2007 F-2 First Live Bomb Training 
OD OD OD 
2013 F-2 JDAM Drop Demonstration 
2003 Shigeru Ishiba mention 








2003~ Increase of Intercept Activity N/A BOTH OD 
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Disposition 
of Forces 2015 
Establishment of 9th 
Fighter Wing OD BOTH OD 
Means 
Aircrafts 
2000 F-2 Replaced F-1 
OD OD OD 
2011 JASDF Contracted to Purchase 42 F-35 
2000 E-767 Operation Start 
N/A BOTH OD 2006 E-767 Upgrade 
2015 E-2D Hawkeye Purchase Decision 
2006 KC-767 Acquisition 
OD OD OD 
2015 KC-46 Pegasus Purchase Decision 
2004 TACOM Development Start N/A BOTH OD 
2014 RQ-4 Purchase Decision 
2007 C-2 Development Start OD N/A N/A 




2009 ATD-X Development Start OD OD OD 




2004 BMD Development DD BOTH DD 
2007 PAC-3 Deployment DD BOTH DD 
2006 FPS-5 Operation, FPS-3 Upgrade DD BOTH OD 
2012 Tokyo/Okinawa PAC-3  DD BOTH DD 
*OD: Offensive Defense, DD: Defensive Defense, BOTH: It can be either OD or DD,  
N/A: Not-Applicable  
↓ ↓ ↓ 
JASDF’s Strategy since the Early 2000s: Offensive Defense 
- Objective of War : Keeping favored political/military situation by deterrence, early 
repelling, and engaging international and regional security environment  
- Battle Space: Border and enemy’s territory beyond the mainland 
- Effort of Counter Offensive: Simultaneously conducting defense and counter-attack, 
considering preemptive attack 
- Period of War: Pursuing short war 
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As shown in Table 2, the JASDF’s strategy has evolved into an “offensive 
defense” strategy. Especially, the changes of defense concept in NDPG, the acceptance of 
air-to-ground strike operation concept, the acquisitions of the air-to-ground fighter and 
weapons, and the securing of the aerial refueling tanker are the predominant elements 
showing the evolution of the JASDF’s strategy. Some may interpret the strengthening of 
the JASDF’s air defense system, which is located in the last row of the table, as 
reinforcement of the former “defensive defense” strategy in terms of battle space and 
period of war. However, considering that the third characteristic of “offensive defense” is 
that the strategy conducts defense and counterattack simultaneously from the early stage 
of war, these features are also a part of the JASDF’s “offensive defense” strategy. 
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III. FACTORS OF JASDF’S STRATEGY EVOLUTION 
This chapter analyzes four independent variables, to evaluate which have had the 
most influence in changing the JASDF’s strategy. The independent variables of the 
JASDF’s strategy evolution to be verified in this research are the modernization of the 
PLA, North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile threat, the conservative swing of 
Japanese domestic politics, and the offensive nature of air power. 
A. CHINA FACTOR  
In the 21st century, economic growth and military buildup of China have brought 
about many security concerns among its East Asian neighbors. The rapid economic 
growth in China since the early 2000s naturally became the driving force that allowed the 
Chinese military to achieve modernization and military buildup. The Chinese military has 
modernized the old equipment of all military units, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
missile and cyber units. These changes in weapons systems mean changes in the 
operational concept and strategy of the Chinese military. The neighboring countries view 
this Chinese military evolution as a threat, and in response, they increase their military 
strength causing an arms race in East Asia. Military spending in the Asia region 
accounted for 22.8 percent of world military expenditures in 2015.118 Although U.S. 
military expenditures accounted for 38.3 percent of the world’s military expenditures, 
nearly 37 percent of the world’s military expenditure outside the United States was spent 
in Asia. In particular, China’s military spending accounted for 41 percent of the Asian 
military expenditure in 2015.119  
The rise of China has raised tensions particularly with Japan, another powerful 
nation in East Asia. The two countries, which are the second and third largest economies 
in the world, have faced conflict in the East China Sea due to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
territorial issues in the past. The Diaoyu/Senkaku island chain has strategic importance to 
                                                 
 118Institute for Strategic Studies and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
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China because it connects the Chinese “first island chain” from the Korean peninsula and 
Okinawa to Taiwan and the Philippines, and Japan also regards the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
island chain as a significant place because China can monitor activity of the U.S.-Japan 
allied force when China occupies the region.120 In addition, economic value such as 
natural resources is another area in which the two countries hold fast to their own 
interests.121 Furthermore, China announced the China Air Defense Identification Zone 
(CADIZ) in the East China Sea including the Diaoyu/Senkaku island chain in November 
2013,122 and Tokyo protested to Beijing when a Chinese fighter flew very close to a 
Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, which was scouting in the East China Sea, in June 
2014.123 In the long-standing conflict between the two countries, the modernization of 
the PLA and military activities based on that modernization are the main threat to the 
Japanese national interests and that have provoked Japan’s aggressive response. 
1. PLA’s Air Power Buildup and Modernization 
This section examines the change of China’s military spending and the trends of 
PLA’s air power buildup after 2000s in terms of the PLAAF, the PLARF, and the PLAN. 
a. China’s Economic Development and Increase of Military Expenditure 
China’s economic growth and the increase of its defense budget are the significant 
driving forces of the PLA’s strategic changes and military modernization. China’s 
economy has shown the most rapid growth in the world entering the 2000s. The Chinese 
gross domestic product (GDP) was only 396 billion dollars in 1990 and 734 billion 
dollars in 1995; however, China had recorded double digit economic growth since the 
late of 1990s, when the GDP was recorded as 1,208 billion dollars in 2000, 2,291 billion 
dollars in 2005, 6,005 billion dollars in 2010, and 10,982 billon dollars in 2015, 
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respectively.124 The Chinese GDP in 1990 was only 12.6 percent of the Japanese GDP; 
however, that grew to 27 percent in 2000 and 49.4 percent in 2005. Chinese GDP finally 
overtook the Japanese GDP in 2010 when it recorded 108 percent of the Japanese GDP, 
so China has become the second largest economic power in the world.125 Based on this 
economic growth, China’s military expenditure also has increased greatly. Chinese 
military expenditure was only 10 billion dollars in 1990, which was one-third of Japanese 
military expenditure; however, Chinese military spending has rapidly increased with its 
economic growth since the late of 1990s, and that amounted to about half of Japanese 
military spending in 2000 by recording 23 billon dollars. By 2005, China first passed 
Japan in military spending, reportedly spending 45 billion dollars, in comparison to 
Japan’s 44 billion dollars.126 China’s military expenditure has continuously increased 
since then, and China recorded 115 billion dollars in 2010 and 214 billon dollars in 2015, 
so China’s military expenditure is about five times that of Japan.127  
As opposed to the increase in China’s defense spending based on its economic 
growth, Japan has not greatly increased military spending due to the continued stagnation 
of economic growth since the 1990s. A comparison is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  China and Japan’s GDP and Military Expenditure in 1990–2015128 
 
b. PLAAF’s Military Buildup: Toward “Strategic Air Force” 
Based on this economic growth and military expenditure, the PLA has made 
many efforts to modernize the military. The PLA has revised operation concepts and 
acquired modernized weapon systems in all areas including the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, as well as the Rocket Force (formerly the Second Artillery Corps), cyber warfare 
forces, intelligence forces, and special operation forces. Among the PLA’s modernization 
efforts, the PLA’s strengthening of air power and the missile forces have had the greatest 
impact on the JASDF’s evolving strategy. 
By the late 1990s, the PLAAF had emphasized modernization by focusing on the 
strengthening of air defense by missile power.129 The PLAAF’s main operation concepts 
were to neutralize the access of enemy by the Anti-Air Artillery (AAA), the Surface-to-
Air Missile (SAM), and electronic jamming and to achieve coercive effect by striking 
enemy bases and the operational and strategic targets by ballistic missiles because of 
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limited military budget and the gap of military technology with the U.S. and Japanese Air 
Force.130 Since the 2000s, however, the PLAAF has been pursuing a mission to directly 
carry out strategic air strikes by using air power.131 PLAAF’s change has shifted 
PLAAF’s strategy from absolutely defensive manner to a combination of offensive 
manner and defensive manner.132 The PLAAF’s officers and the Chinese strategists refer 
to this as PLAAF’s change to a “strategic air force.”133  
The “strategic air force” concept that the PLAAF’s officers and the Chinese 
strategists have discussed is as follows: 
A clearly defined strategy and an accompanying set of missions that 
enable it to directly achieve important national security objectives and 
play a decisive role in protecting Chinese national interest; requirements 
for modern platforms and systems that are commensurate with China’s 
standing as a major power, including advanced offensive and defensive 
capabilities; and finally, the institutional status befitting its role as a 
‘strategic service,’ and important consideration given that historically the 
PLAAF has been relegated to a subordinate role in China’s traditionally 
ground force-dominated military.134  
Based on this concept, the PLAAF began to emphasize the offensive mission, 
utilization of space assets, and the accomplishment of deterrence, and officially adopted 
the goal to “integrate air and space and be simultaneously prepared for offensive and 
defensive operations” as the PLAAF’s strategic concept in 2004, then it became a 
guidance for the PLAAF’s modernization and operation.135 Many PLAAF officers 
regard the formulation of strategic concept in 2004 as a significant turning point for the 
PLAAF. 136  In addition, the PLAAF’s commander became a Central Military 
Commission (CMC) member, which is the top military decision-making organization and 
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allowed only the Army commander as a member before 2004, with the commanders of 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the People’s Liberation Army Second 
Artillery Force (PLASAF) since 2004, marking another important turning point.137 
The pursuit of a “strategic air force” was reflected in the Chinese defense white 
papers, and the Defense White Paper 2008 mentioned the forces construction policy of 
the PLAAF as follows: “To meet the requirements of informationized warfare, the Air 
Force is working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive 
and defensive operation, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and 
early warning, air strike, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to 
build itself into a modernized strategic air force.”138 This same policy has appeared in 
the later defense white papers without major changes until 2015. 
The key goals of PLAAF’s change analyzed by Chinese military experts are first, 
to possess strategic deterrence capabilities in all fields such as the nuclear, conventional, 
space, information warfare, and civilian component, and second, to destroy quickly the 
enemy’s operational system by getting out of the former territorial defense missions and 
having long raid capabilities.139 The salient change is that the PLAAF has emphasized 
offensive capabilities based on the two earlier goals.140 
This change in strategy and operational concept of the PLAAF has been reflected 
in the PLA’s modernization and buildup of war potential. First, the PLA has been 
increasing the proportion of the new-type multi-purpose fighters. By 1995, 80 percent of 
the PLAAF’s fighters were Soviet MiG-17s and MiG-19s, which had been used since the 
1950s; however, China weeded out 3,500 fighters and replaced 70 percent of these 
fighters with new fighters from 1990 to 2010.141 China introduced the 4.5-generation 
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fighters such as the J-11 and Su-30 in the 2000s, and China has been trying to buy 
additional Su-35 4.5-generation fighters from Russia while developing itself fifth-
generation fighters such as the J-20 and J-31.142 According to research by the RAND 
Corporation, it is expected that the number of U.S. Air Force fighter wings needed for 
completely neutralizing the PLAAF in the region will increase from 2.1 fighter wings in 
1995 to 29.9 fighter wings in 2017 due to PLAAF’s acquisition of new fighters and 
modernization.143 Especially, the PLAAF has enhanced its offensive capabilities by 
changing the composition of the aircraft from the intercept mission fighter-oriented 
composition to the supporting aircraft and multi-purpose air-to-ground attack fighter-
oriented composition.144 The intercept fighters were 75 percent and air-to-ground attack 
fighters were only 15 percent of total PLAAF aircraft in 1995; however, the intercept 
fighters have been decreased to 42 percent and air-to-ground attack fighters have reached 
35 percent of total PLAAF aircraft in 2015.145 
The PLAAF has taken the shape of an offensive strategic air force by acquiring 
new fighters, as well as various supporting aircraft and special mission aircraft. China has 
been progressing its upgrade of H-6K bombers, such as integrating new long distance 
precision guided munitions (PGM) capability to strengthen bombing capabilities reaching 
the “second island chain” and deterrence capabilities against neighboring threats.146 The 
purpose of China’s construction of a 9,000ft class runway is known for operating new H-
6K bombers.147 China is also pushing the acquisition of additional tankers forward to 
extend long distance power projection capabilities. The H-6U tankers introduced in the 
1980s are serving now; however, those are too old, so China contracted to buy Il-78 
aerial tankers in 2011 to provide refueling to new Su-30MMK fighters and KJ-2000 
                                                 
142National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2016, 28.  
143RAND Corporation, U.S.-China Military Scorecard (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 83, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html. 
144National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2016, 27.  
145Ibid.  
146Chase and Garafola, “China’s Search for a ‘Strategic Air Force,’” 18.  
147National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2016, 25.  
 52
AWACS.148 In addition, China had been promoting the acquisition of AWACS since the 
1990s. The original plan was to introduce radar from Israel and to operate it by mounting 
the radar on the Il-76 transport aircraft; however, the United States opposed it and 
stopped Israel, and China indigenously developed the KJ-2000 AWACS, which has been 
operating since 2013.149 Since then, China also developed the KJ-200 and KJ-500 
AWACS, and those aircraft are serving now.150 Furthermore, the PLAAF has advanced 
modernization by developing and acquiring a variety of UAVs, long distance large cargo, 
an integrated air defense system, C4I system, and electronic warfare capabilities.  
With the full-fledged construction of a strategic air force and modernization of 
equipment in the 2000s, the PLAAF has been pushing forward with the changes in 
training and exercise to nurture manpower in accordance with advanced technology and 
modernized equipment. The PLAAF’s exercises are becoming more and more complex, 
large-scale, and frequent, and it prioritizes the integration of information and technology 
in the training process.151 Moreover, it pursues training in the same conditions as real 
war and focuses on fostering the ability that can flexibly handle various and rapidly 
changing situations, which may occur in the enemy’s penetration.152 
c. Strengthening of Missile Forces 
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which was the PLASAF 
before December 2015, takes charge of the Chinese strategic missile forces, and conducts 
nuclear deterrence, nuclear counterattack, and precise attack through conventional 
missiles.153 The PLARF had possessed only nuclear missiles until the 1980s; however, it 
has been constructing a variety of conventional missile forces since the late 1990s and 
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pursuing quantitative and qualitative diversification and modernization, so it has become 
a key threat to East Asian neighbors.154 Even though the original purpose of the 
PLARF’s missile power was deterrence, coercion, and war fighting in the Taiwan Strait, 
it is expected that the PLARF will conduct significant missions in conflicts with 
neighboring states, including those that could occur in the South China Sea and the East 
China Sea, by the modernization and increasing missile ranges.155 
The key components of the PLARF can be divided into two parts: the nuclear 
forces and the conventional missile forces. The direction of the PLARF’s modernization 
also can be analyzed according to those two parts. First, in the case of the nuclear forces, 
China’s nuclear warheads have rapidly increased in number since 2006. The number of 
China’s nuclear warheads increased from 130 in 2006 to 176 in 2008 and to 240 in 2010, 
which it maintained until 2012, and it is known that China has 260 nuclear warheads 
since 2015.156 In addition to these quantitative changes, the PLARF also has been 
aiming to make various qualitative changes in nuclear forces. The launch system of 
China’s nuclear weapons relied on silos until the 1990s; however, China has developed 
and deployed a variety of mobile launchers and replaced the liquid propellant with solid 
propellant since the 2000s.157 Then, the PLARF began to cull the DF-3, DF-4 missiles, 
which were deployed from the 1970s and the 1980s, while it deployed new long-range 
missiles, such as DF-5/5A, DF-21/21A, DF-31, and the PLARF has been developing 
various new generation medium and long-range nuclear warhead ballistic missiles since 
the after early 2000s.158  
Second, the modernization of the PLARF is more remarkable in the conventional 
missile forces. The PLARF’s missiles were all nuclear warhead missiles in 1985, whereas 
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the nuclear missile ratio dropped to 40 percent until 2012.159 China first operated the 
conventional missiles in 1993, and China had intended to use the conventional missile 
forces for management of the Taiwan Strait by developing the DF-15 Short-Range 
Ballistic Missile (SRBM) and conducting launch training during the third Taiwan Strait 
crisis.160 However, the PLARF, which consisted of only the SRBMs until the 1990s, has 
been acquiring Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) and Intermediate-Range 
Ballistic Missile (IRBM) since the 2000s,161 and the projection range of the PLARF has 
been extended for the purpose of precise strike against an enemy’s land and sea targets, 
aircraft carriers, and supporting forces in the “first island chain” beyond Taiwan.162 
Through the diversification of missiles and warheads, the PLARF’s cruise missiles and 
conventional ballistic missiles can attack various key strategic targets such as U.S. bases 
in alliances and neighboring countries’ C4I and communication facilities, military bases, 
naval ships in near seas.163 
d. PLAN’s Development of Aircraft Carrier 
Not only the PLAAF and the PLARF, but the PLAN’s development of an aircraft 
carrier is another significant strengthening of the PLA’s air power. China has entered an 
aircraft carrier power by the renovation and modernization of Russian-made naval ship 
Variag since August 2011 and launched it in September 2012 under the name of 
Liaoning.164 China is operating it by mounting it with the J-15 aircraft, which are 
remodeled Russian-made Su-27 aircraft for the aircraft carriers, 165  and China is 
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developing the J-31 fifth-generation aircraft carrier fighter.166 China is also pushing 
forward the acquisition of a rotary-wing AEW platform, which can be mounted on 
carriers.167 In addition, a satellite image containing the Chinese second aircraft carrier 
under construction, which is being developed autonomously, was released to the media 
through the homepage of a U.S. military intelligence company on June 3, 2016.168 The 
Chinese aircraft carriers will be used for securing air superiority, anti-submarine 
operations, and early warning missions in the near seas. Many experts expect that the 
Chinese aircraft carrier is limited to offensive air strike missions due to the ski-jump 
method carrier structure and load of the J-15;169 however, it will also affect the 
projection of offensive forces when China additionally develops new aircraft catapulting 
methods and new fighters. China will continue to pursue the strengthening of air power 
by acquiring additional aircraft carriers to achieve strategic deterrence, air superiority, 
and offensive power projection in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. 
2. JASDF’s Response 
The PLA’s modernization and military buildup has affected the Japan’s defense 
concept changes in the NDPG and the direction of the JASDF’s construction by changing 
Japan’s threat perception. The Japanese defense posture concept in the NDPG has 
changed, as mentioned earlier, from the “Basic Defense Capability” in 2004 to the 
“Dynamic Defense Force” in 2010 and the “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” in 2013. 
While the NDPG 1976 focused on the defense of the Japanese mainland against the 
Soviet threat, and the NDPG 1995 focused on the uncertainty of regional security 
consequences of the end of the Cold War, the major security factors that have the great 
impact on the NDPG since 2004 is Chinese and North Korean threat. 
In NDPG 2004, Japan defined China as “a major impact on regional security” and 
stated that Japan should examine carefully the Chinese acts in the future because China 
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continuously promotes the modernization of its nuclear and missile capabilities, naval 
forces, and air powers.170 In this perception, even though Japan maintained the “Basic 
Defense Capability” concept that came from the former NDPGs, it emphasized the 
independent and proactive activities to cope with various threats and international 
security situations.171  
This Japanese threat perception of China has become more specific through the 
NDPG 2010 and the NDPG 2013. In the NDPG 2010, Japan defined China as “a growing 
major power,” and it was concerned about the lack of transparency shown in increasing 
military expenditure, the modernization of the various forces, expansion of long-range 
power projection capabilities, and maritime activities.172 Hence, Japan saw the necessity 
of a dynamic and active defense posture that can counteract flexibly and rapidly against a 
variety of threats, and it made a significant change to its defense posture concept by 
adopting the “Dynamic Defense Force” concept.173 The NDPG 2013 also worried more 
minutely about China’s military spending trend, the asymmetric military capabilities, and 
the various military buildups.174 It directly referred to the Chinese marine and aerial 
activities in the East China Sea and the South China Sea as “attempts to change the status 
quo by coercion”175 and stated that “Japan has great concern about these Chinese 
activities.”176 
The strengthening of the PLARF’s nuclear power and conventional missile forces 
has prompted discussion of preemptive strike and air-to-ground attack capability for the 
JASDF. Although so far the discussion on the possessing preemptive strike capability has 
mostly emerged when North Korea undertook nuclear and missile tests, and Japan also 
referred to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the greatest threat to 
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Japan, China has been acting as a driver for the Japanese preemptive strike and air-to-
ground attack capability in terms of Japan’s concern for Chinese nuclear and missile 
forces in NDPG.  
Some analysts observe that China’s actions drive Japan’s reactions more directly 
than Japan explicitly acknowledges. Christopher Hughes claims that the purpose of Japan 
emphasizing North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities as the significant threats 
despite a lack of demonstrated capability is to hide the motive to counteract China and to 
give legitimacy to Japan’s military buildup.177 He also argues that JASDF’s acquisition 
of the F-35 and JDAM empowered Japan to strike China in emergency situations.178  
In particular, as depicted in Figure 5, the whole area of Japan has been within the 
range of Chinese missiles since the 2000s due to the diversification of the PLARF’s 
missile forces and increased missile ranges. 
Figure 5.  Second Artillery Missile Threats to Bases in the Western Pacific179 
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Japan receives nuclear deterrence through the U.S.-Japan alliance and has 
developed missile defense capabilities through the alliance’s development of advanced 
missile defense (MD) systems. Nevertheless, the PLARF’s quantitative and qualitative 
buildup of nuclear and missile forces provide a mission for the JASDF’s preemptive 
strike and air-to-ground attack capabilities, which can neutralize and destroy the 
Chinese nuclear and missile threats in an emergency. Furthermore, due to the ongoing 
territorial dispute with China in the East China Sea, Japan needs the JASDF’s air-to-
ground capabilities to repel Chinese troops conducting a landing operation into the 
Japanese islands.180 
The PLAAF has pursued an offensive strategic air force through the increasing of 
the multi-role air-to-ground fighters and the acquisition of modern bombers. In addition, 
China has strengthened air superiority capabilities through the increase in the fourth and 
fifth generation new fighters, the acquisitions of AWACS, tankers, and the PLAN’s 
aircraft carrier. The JASDF has coped with these Chinese changes by the aggressive and 
active intercept activities. Intercept missions that are not quick or aggressive enough will 
threaten Japanese mainland soon because China has changed the composition of aircraft 
from the air-to-air fighters-oriented composition to the air-to-ground fighters-oriented 
composition, and it has strengthened its long-range power projection capabilities through 
the new bombers. Moreover, active intercept activities against the PLAAF have become 
an important mission to the JASDF because Japan cannot ensure the autonomy of its 
naval activities in the East China Sea when the JASDF fails to maintain the air 
superiority capability balance in the region. In fact, while the most of the JASDF’s 
scramble missions were due to the Russian track until 2008, since then the number of 
scramble missions caused by the Chinese track has rapidly increased, and about half of 
the JASDF’s scramble missions have been due to the Chinese track since 2010.181  
The JASDF’s bases and troop movements have also been influenced by China. 
Through the defense white paper, Japan stated that the establishment of the 9th Fighter 
Wing by adding one F-15J squadron in Okinawa is a counteract against Chinese acts, 
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intruding Japanese territorial waters and airspace in the East China Sea and announcing 
the extended CADIZ.182  
The changes of the JASDF’s strategic means, such as various weapon systems, 
are also related to the PLA’s modernization. The acquisition of the F-35 fifth-generation 
stealth multi-role fighters, tankers, and introduction of the JDAM air-to-ground precision 
guided munitions are tools for counter air strike and air-to-ground attack capabilities to 
respond to China’s nuclear and missile power. The stealth performance of the F-35 
fighter is the purpose of the offensive counter-air and strike missions through covert 
infiltration, and JDAM, which is equipped with GPS guidance kits to the general free-fall 
bombs, should be dropped above the target by entering directly into the enemy’s area 
unlike the stand-off cruise missiles. Thus, both of them are quite offensive weapon 
systems. In addition, Japan has deployed the F-2 fighters having air-to-ground 
capabilities since the 2000s, and the F-2 fighters will conduct CAS missions to repel the 
PLA’s island landing operations that could occur in the island dispute between the two 
countries.  
The Japanese F-35 fighters, which also have excellent air-to-air performance 
compared to other aircraft and the AWACS, will be used to achieve air superiority 
against the PLA’s air power. Japan’s development of a next-generation stealth fighter 
also has the purpose of responding to China, which has developed a variety of new 
fighters and strengthened air power in the airspace of the East China Sea.  
In addition, the JASDF has developed a BMD system and deployed the PAC-3 
missiles to Okinawa and Tokyo and the FPS-3 and FPS-5 air control and warning radars 
in order to strengthen missile defense of the mainland. The four FPS-5 radars and seven 
FPS-3 radars can monitor the Chinese mainland. The radar systems quickly detect 
launched ballistic missiles and provide the JASDF’s PAC-3 missiles and the JMSDF’s 
SM-3 missiles with information.183  
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B. NORTH KOREA FACTOR  
North Korea’s continuous nuclear weapon and missile development is one of the 
most significant security issues in the East Asia region. South Korea, which lies in direct 
military confrontation with North Korea, as well as the United States, Japan, China, and 
Russia speak with one voice that North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat will bring 
about negative impact on not only East Asian security but also international security and 
the non-proliferation of WMD effort. Among them, Japan has voiced concerns with the 
most sensitive attitude about North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat along with South 
Korea. Japan, which alone has the experience of being bombed with nuclear weapons, is 
alarmed by the prospect that the Japanese mainland could come to be in the range of 
North Korea's ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. 
1. North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threat 
This section examines the history of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats to 
analyze those effects to JASDF’s evolving strategy. 
a. North Korea’s Nuclear Development 
North Korea sent their nuclear scientists to the Soviet Union for training 
beginning in 1956, and North Korea and the Soviet Union concluded the “Agreement for 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” in September 1959.184 North 
Korea began in earnest nuclear activities by constructing a nuclear-power research 
complex in Yongbyon in 1964 and introducing a research reactor, IRT-2000, from the 
Soviet Union in 1965.185 After the middle 1970s, North Korea began to show nuclear 
activities having nuclear weapons development in mind, based on nuclear engineers and 
basic nuclear technologies accumulated from the Soviet Union, and it began in earnest 
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the nuclear weapon development by starting construction of its own secret nuclear facility 
in the Yongbyon area in the early 1980s.186 
North Korea has accelerated the development of a nuclear weapon by conducting 
high explosive experiments nearly 40 times since 1983 and has continuously carried 
forward the development of nuclear weapons in secret after withdrawal from the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on March 21, 1993.187 Even though the quantitative 
expansion of North Korea’s nuclear weapon had been restricted because of its withdrawal 
from the NPT, which was deferred by a high-level talk between North Korea and the 
United States in June 1993, and nuclear development was ceased by the “Geneva Agreed 
Framework” in 1994, the qualitative expansion, which is the improvement and 
enhancement of nuclear weapons, could not have been prevented because North Korea 
kept up development of a nuclear weapon in secret.188 Furthermore, North Korea began 
to pay attention to the development of a nuclear weapon by enrichment of uranium since 
the early 1990s. This is because it can no longer advance development of a nuclear 
weapon by plutonium after accepting inspection of the Yongbyon nuclear facility due to 
international pressure, but North Korea opened the way for quantitative expansion of 
nuclear weapons by canceling the nuclear freeze in 2002.189 
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported to President George W. 
Bush in June 2002 through the “National Information Estimate” that North Korea started 
the enrichment of uranium since 2001, and the United States concluded in August 2002 
through the assessment of intelligence agencies that North Korea’s High-Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) development led to significant progress.190 After that, at a high-level 
talk between the United States and North Korea in Pyongyang in October 2002, Sok-ju 
Kang, First Vice Foreign Minister at the time, replied that “North Korea will have 
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something even more than the nuclear weapon” to James Kelly, former Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who had asked about North Korea’s 
uranium plan. Thus, North Korea practically admitted to having a development plan for 
the uranium nuclear weapon.191 Finally, North Korea announced withdrawal of from the 
NPT again in January 2003.  
After that time, North Korea has developed the nuclear weapon through four 
nuclear tests from 2006 to 2016. North Korea formalized a nuclear nation by carrying out 
the first nuclear test using plutonium in the vicinity of P’unggye, Hamgyong Province, on 
October 9, 2006, and it became the ninth nuclear power in the world.192 The first of 
North Korea’s nuclear tests received an evaluation of “success, but not perfect” because 
North Korea gave notice to China about the explosion scale of 4 kt, but the actual 
explosion scale was less than 1 kt.193 On May 25, 2009, North Korea carried out the 
second nuclear test and announced that its nuclear test was successful.194 The explosion 
scale of the second nuclear test was rated as 2 kt, and it was analyzed that the technology 
was a step forward compared to the first nuclear test.195 In addition, as the possibility 
that North Korea has the ability to combine the nuclear weapon and the ballistic missile 
arose, the concerns of its neighbors were amplified.196 North Korea went ahead with the 
third nuclear test, and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense estimated the explosion 
scale as 6–7 kt. 197  After the third nuclear test, North Korea presented that the 
miniaturization and lightening of the nuclear weapon was achieved, and experts analyzed 
that North Korea is focusing on development of a nuclear warhead that can be mounted 
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on a long-range ballistic missile through the nuclear tests.198 At the fourth nuclear test 
conducted on January 6, 2016, North Korea externally exposed starting development of a 
hydrogen bomb by expressing “the first hydrogen bomb test” rather than “the fourth 
nuclear test.”199 Some analyzed that North Korea’s hydrogen bomb test failed because 
the explosion scale was only 8 kt, but others analyzed that the fourth nuclear test was a 
boosted nuclear weapon test phase, which is former phase of the hydrogen bomb 
development.200 Regarding that the hydrogen bomb and the boosted fission bomb are 
essential technologies for miniaturization of the nuclear weapon, North Korea might be 
focusing on the development of a tactical nuclear weapon and the capability of a ballistic 
missile equipped with a nuclear warhead.201  
According to the recent study of the Institute for Science and International 
Security, North Korea might possess about 13–21 of nuclear weapons as of July 2016 on 
the basis of these nuclear tests.202 Also, the Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense is 
deciding that North Korea’s technologies of nuclear miniaturization and lightening that 
can be mounted on the ballistic missile have progressed considerably.203  
In sum, entering the 2000s, North Korea has carried out the enrichment of 
uranium, the cancellation of the nuclear freeze, and withdrawal from the NPT and has 
proceeded with the miniaturization and lightening of the nuclear warhead through several 
nuclear tests. By these efforts, North Korea has militarily weaponized the nuclear 
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capability in earnest. This nuclearization of North Korea combined with the ballistic 
missile has evolved into one of the most substantive and dangerous threats from its 
former status as an uncertain and possible threat to its neighbors, including Japan, and 
international security environment since the 2000s. 
b. North Korea’s Missile Development 
Even if the nuclear weapon is developed, delivery means is necessary in order to 
use that the developed weapon. Generally, the delivery means of a nuclear weapon is 
divided into three types: the aircraft, the ground launched ballistic missile, and the 
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).  
For North Korea, aircraft delivery does not appear to be the most feasible option.  
Among North Korea’s aircraft, the IL-28 light bomber, the MIG-23, and the MIG-29 
fighter can deliver the nuclear weapon. Downsizing and weight reduction of the nuclear 
weapon would be required in order to mount it on the MIG fighters, and the operational 
radius of the MIG fighters is quite limited because North Korea has no aerial refueling 
capability. The IL-28 bomber seems to be the only possible delivery method by 
aircraft.204 But the IL-28 is also fairly old, and North Korea does not have escort fighters 
that can protect the bomber from the modern interceptor fighters and air defense systems 
of neighboring countries.  
North Korea’s development of delivery means for its nuclear weapon has been 
focused on ground-launched ballistic missiles. Furthermore, this ballistic missile is 
regarded as a fatal threat because it can be used for not only the nuclear warhead but also 
for a biochemical warhead or high-explosive warhead.  
North Korea secured basic missile technology and a development foundation by 
acquiring missile technology from the Soviet Union and training technicians since the 
early 1960s. 205  In addition, North Korea acquired ballistic missile technology by 
cooperating with several Middle East countries since the 1970s, and it developed 
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autonomously the reproduction of a SCUD-B based on a number of SCUD-Bs provided 
from Egypt, and succeeded in a test-firing in 1984.206 After that, North Korea mass-
produced and deployed SCUD-B missiles since 1985, and it started to do its own research 
and development of a variety of long-range ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD-C, 
Rodong, Taepodong-1, Taepodong-2, and Musudan missiles, based on the SCUD-B 
missile from 1987 to 1992.207  
SCUD-B missiles entered service in 1985 have about 320 km of distance of range, 
and SCUD-C missiles, which were successfully test fired and deployed in May 1993, 
have about 500 km of distance of range, so the entirety of the Korean peninsula is within 
the range of North Korea’s SCUD missiles.208 On the other hand, the Taepodong-1 and 
Taepodong-2 missiles currently being developed are medium- and long-range ballistic 
missiles that can reach up to 2,500 km and 6,700 km, respectively, and the Musudan 
missile, which is a ground mobile version of the Soviet Union’s R-27 SLBM and 
deployed 15–20 missiles without test-firing in 2003, is also a medium- and long-range 
ballistic missile having a 2,500–3,000 km range.209  
Above all, Japan began to feel the real threat from North Korean missiles since 
the Rodong medium-range ballistic missile deployed. When the first test of a Rodong 
missile was conducted in 1993, the missile flew about 500 km and fell in the East Sea of 
Korea, and the track of the missile was headed for Tokyo.210 In July 2006, two or three 
Rodong missiles were launched again toward the far east of Russia and Hokkaido of 
Japan.211 
As depicted in Figure 6, all of Japanese mainland is within the range of the 
Rodong missile, which is about 1,300 km, and the Rodong missile can reach the Japanese 
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mainland in seven to ten minutes with a speed of Mach 15–20.212 The Rodong missile 
was also designed to accommodate all conventional warheads, nuclear warheads, and 
biochemical warheads, and more than 300 Rodong missiles have been deployed since 
1995 until now.213 Considering the firing range, the capability, the reaction time, and the 
speed, the Rodong missile became the most dangerous threat to Japan.  
Figure 6.  North Korean Missile Range214 
 
The third means of nuclear weapons delivery for North Korea would be 
submarine launched ballistic missiles. North Korea’s efforts here have been more recent 
but no less important. North Korea bought 12 disused submarines from Russia in 
September 1993, and several Golf-II class submarines were equipped with the SSN-5 
SLBM, which is the original type of Rodong missile.215 When North Korea introduced 
the submarines, the SLBM was removed; however, the missile launching system, such as 
the launching tube and the stabilizer, was maintained.  
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Lately, North Korea is concentrating on the development of an SLBM and has 
made progress in the development of that launching system.216 Even though North 
Korea’s SLBM tests conducted so far have been analyzed as failures or at an early 
stage, the SLBM launched on August 24, 2016, flew about 500 km toward Japan, and 
a South Korean military officer said that North Korea’s SLBM technology seems to 
have progressed.217 
In the case of Japan, which is surrounded on four sides by the sea, the SLBM 
being launched secretly through a submarine could be the most serious threat posing the 
greatest challenge to the Japanese missile defense system. 
2. JASDF’s Response 
This section analyzes the Japan’s perception toward the North Korean threats and 
JASDF’s strategic response. 
a. Intensification of Japan’s Threat Perception and NK’s Scenarios 
As mentioned previously, North Korea is increasing its ability to attack Japan 
directly through the development of missiles. An analysis of the Japanese defense white 
papers reveals that Japan has expressed concern about the deployment of the Rodong 
missile since 2001, so it has regarded the North Korean missile threat as a substantive 
military threat since then. Furthermore, Japan has worried about North Korea’s 
biochemical weapon capability and its combination with the ballistic missile since 
2003.218 In addition, Japan’s concern about the missile threat equipped with the nuclear 
warhead seems to have increased because the white paper has analyzed intensively the 
possibility of miniaturization of a nuclear warhead since 2006.219  
Above all, it is the most likely that North Korea will launch the ballistic missile 
equipped the nuclear warhead or the biochemical warhead to threaten and prevent U.S. 
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forces deploying from Japan to Korea during a crisis situation on the Korean Peninsula. 
Because what North Korea fears the most is reinforcement of the U.S. military to the 
Korean Peninsula during a crisis, North Korea can use the nuclear weapon and missile by 
firing it directly at the military base in Japan or by threatening Japan to launch missiles at 
cities of Japan to prevent the reinforcement.  
Second, North Korea can use the nuclear weapon and missile as a means of 
political and diplomatic protest against international sanctions. Recently, Japan is taking 
a hard-line attitude toward North Korea’s nuclear and missile development by 
participating actively in international sanctions and making its own sanctions. So, North 
Korea is likely to continue missile tests toward the Japanese mainland as an expression of 
complaint and dissatisfaction.  
Lastly, if a full-scale war occurred on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea was 
beleaguered, North Korea could use the nuclear weapon and missile as a bargaining chip 
for a ceasefire or a signal of last stand by firing missiles indiscriminately at the U.S. 
forces’ deployment area such as Japan and Guam. Under these scenarios, North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile threat is practical and a fatal threat to Japan, and the Japanese security 
and defense policy after the early 2000s has been affected by this threat. 
b. JASDF’s Response to the North Korean Threat 
First, North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat has affected the JSDF’s defense 
concept. As stated earlier, Japan’s defense concept has changed from the “Basic Defense 
Capability” concept in the 2004 NDPG to the “Dynamic Defense Force” concept in the 
2010 NDPG, and to the “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” concept in the 2013 NDPG. In 
the background of this change, Japan’s perception of the North Korean threat has been an 
important driver. Though there was no direct mention about the North Korean threat until 
the 1976 NDPG and the 1996 NDPG, Japan directly stated in the 2004 NDPG that North 
Korea’s development, deployment, and diffusion of the WMD and missiles is a 
destabilizing factor for regional security, international security, and nonproliferation 
efforts.220 Also in the 2010 NDPG, Japan worried about North Korea’s continuous 
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development and deployment of the WMD and missiles and put more emphasis on North 
Korea’s threat being an immediate and serious factor making the regional security 
unstable.221 In the 2013 NDPG, Japan also mentioned that North Korea is maintaining 
the asymmetric military capability by developing, deploying, and diffusing the WMD, 
including the nuclear weapon and the missile, and it is causing the unstable status of 
regional security.222 Japan particularly stressed North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat 
in the 2013 NDPG by mentioning that the increased range and accuracy of North Korean 
missiles through the advances of missile technology and the possibility of combining the 
nuclear weapon with the ballistic missile by miniaturization are serious and immediate 
threats that Japan is facing.223 To adapt to this change in the defense concept, the 
JASDF’s strategic ends have evolved from the formerly passive and exclusively 
defensive goal of defense of the mainland by air power to the active goal of creating 
politically and militarily advantageous conditions through a rapid, flexible, and assertive 
response to various threats by air power. 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat also has caused the evolution of the 
JASDF’s strategic ways. Above all, the increased North Korean nuclear and missile 
threat brought about the necessity of the JASDF’s air-to-ground capability and 
preemptive strike operation concept. The previous JASDF had excluded completely an 
air-to-ground capability that deviated from the principle of an exclusively defense-
oriented policy, but some Japanese politicians and officers began to have the perception 
that defense against North Korea’s advanced nuclear and missile threat by only the 
missile defense system was restricted.224 Japanese hard-liners claimed that Japan should 
secure enemy base strike capability every time North Korea conducted a nuclear or 
missile test after the Taepodong-1 missile test in 1998, and they also argued that the 
preemptive strike against North Korea’s missile bases when an imminent attack warning 
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exists corresponded to the right of self-defense in a strict sense.225 Following this trend, 
the JASDF possessed the air-to-ground attack capability and formulated the air-to-ground 
training.  
In terms of the strategic means, the JASDF has introduced a variety of weapon 
systems to support the “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” concept and to secure the air-to-
ground capability and the preemptive attack ability and to obtain the capability of early 
detection and warning with regard to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. The 
entering into service of the F-2 fighter in 2000 and the purchase contract of the F-35 
fighter in 2011 means that the JASDF pursues a precision strike against the North Korean 
threat in time of emergency by acquiring the fighters equipped with air-to-ground 
capability that were nonexistent before. In addition, the purchase contract of the KC-767 
aerial refueling tanker, which can extend the operation radius of the air-to-ground 
fighters, was signed in 2003, and four KC-767s introduced and entered service from 2008 
to 2010. Furthermore, to detect, trace, and warn of the launching of North Korean 
missiles and an intrusion of the asymmetric threat, four E-767s have been deployed since 
May 2000, and Japan decided on the acquisition of the RQ-4 UAV and obtained the U.S. 
State Department’s approval.226 With the acquisition of the air-to-ground fighters, the 
JASDF is also operating the JDAM kit since its introduction in 2003 that can strike 
precisely against the ground target. 
The North Korean nuclear and missile threat has directly driven Japan’s 
strengthening of its missile defense system. The trigger factor for Japan’s construction 
policy of its missile defense system was North Korea’s launching of Taepodong-1 in 
August 1998, which passed through the Japanese airspace.227 Japan committed to 
construct the ballistic missile defense system in the National Security Council (NSC) and 
the Cabinet Council in December 2003 and planned to build the two-phase defense 
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system consisting of an Aegis system and PAC-3 missiles.228 Thus, the JASDF deployed 
PAC-3 missiles in the mainland since 2007, and carried forward the upgrade of FPS-3 
radars and the introduction of the new FPS-5 radars to shorten response time and to 
extend detection range. Moreover, the JASDF deployed additionally PAC-3 missiles in 
the vicinity of Tokyo and Okinawa in 2012 to respond to the persisting WMD threats in 
surrounding area. 
C. JAPANESE DOMESTIC CONSERVATIVE SWING FACTOR  
It is commonly asserted that Japanese domestic politics is getting more and more 
conservative and rightist. This evaluation seems to result from characteristics of the 
policies pursued by the conservative prime ministers like Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo 
Abe and right-wing parties such as the LDP. The conservative parties and politicians who 
have been maintaining continuously a majority in the Diet have led to neighboring 
countries’ concern about the Japanese conservative swing, which is characterized by a 
strong and assertive stance toward the normalization of JSDF through amendment of the 
constitution, history issues like Yasukuni Shrine, and territorial conflicts such as the 
Senkaku/Daioyu islands and Dokdo Island. The normalization of the JSDF is being 
magnified in particular as a sensitive issue to the neighboring countries having negative 
memories about past Japanese militarism. The normalization and the changes of the JSDF 
entering the 2000s seem to be affected by not only the changes of the surrounding 
security environment but also the conservative swing of the domestic politics and the 
security and defense policy stance of the conservative politicians. 
1. Conservative Swing of Japanese Leadership and Public 
This section analyzes the conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics in 
terms of its trend, background, and causes, right-wing politicians’ policy stance, and 
movement of revision of security laws.  
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a. Trend, Background, and Causes of Conservative Swing  
Cheolhee Park, a Japanese expert, analyzed that the Japanese conservative swing 
has been progressing in three levels. First, in terms of the dynamics among the parties, 
Japan had experienced political reshuffle represented by the fall of the center and 
progressive parties since the late 1990s, and the conservative forces have seized the 
initiative because the parties of the center have become conservative like the LDP, and 
the Komeito became a coalition ruling party in 1999. At last, in 2012, the political 
reshuffle, in which the progressive parties became isolated and the conservative parties 
were generally strengthened, was complete. As a result, in the dynamics among the 
parties, the phenomenon in which the conservative parties pushed the progressive parties 
out of the ring has endured.229  
Next, in terms of the dynamics within each party, as the conservative-centrist 
faction of the LDP, which was the central force of the LDP, was split in the early and 
middle of 1990s, its absolute political leverage has declined. Since then, the conservative-
liberal faction seemed to have taken the leadership, but its position also has been 
weakened due to the resignation of Ryutaro Hashimoto and the fall of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP). At this juncture, the solidarity of the conservative-rightist 
faction has been strengthened in the LDP, and the hard-line right wingers like Shinzo 
Abe began to appear. This conservative-rightist faction began to spread after Koizumi’s 
rise in 2000, and its sole lead has been strengthened through the general election in 2012 
and the Upper House election in 2013. The number of conservative legislators in the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) also has increased fairly throughout the general 
elections in 2000 and 2003, and it became the foundation of the change in government in 
2009 with the victory in the Upper House election in 2007 and the Lower House election 
in 2009. Since then, the older generation was expelled from power, and the younger 
conservative legislators have held positions of authority in the DPJ, and the bullishness of 
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conservative members in the party was particularly noticeable in the general election in 
2012 again.230  
Third, in terms of the legislators gathering, leagues of conservative and right wing 
legislators have been activated. The conservative forces began to have a non-partisan 
character since the middle of 1990s, and the legislators, who worked in the frame of party 
in 1955 system, began to organize the non-partisan gathering beyond the party 
framework. Good examples of this trend are “the gathering of legislators all paying their 
respect at the Yasukuni Shrine” and “the league of legislators acting to defend the 
Japanese territory.” These leagues have been founded since 1995–1997, and became 
vigorous in 2000–2007 when Koizumi and Abe became prime minister successively. 
Since then, the non-partisan movement, not limited to the LDP members and including 
the members of other parties, has been noticeable. The gatherings are ultimately carrying 
forward a revision of the constitution and taking a completely opposite stand to the 
pacific principle asserted by the progressive forces.231  
This trend of the conservative swing has spread from the political world to the 
society. The traditional right-wing activities have been activated, and the neoconservative 
movement stressing “people,” not “emperor” of the traditional conservatism, has 
noticeably increased at the same time. Furthermore, as the interchange through the 
internet has proliferated in the current of internationalization and an information-oriented 
society, the phenomenon that strengthening identity of the affiliated group and the 
stereotype has appeared, and the conservative mood began to be expressed throughout the 
online environment among the younger generation since the late 1990s. The “net right-
wing” having a far-right character even began to appear. In particular, the Japanese 
younger generation has a tendency toward conservatism that regards the postwar 
generation as the Establishment and expresses anti-sentiment against neighboring 
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countries, and this younger generation has become the foundation of support to 
conservative politicians such as Abe.232   
To analyze the background and causes of the conservative swing of Japanese 
domestic politics requires focusing on the internal factors; first, the necessity of a new 
view of state has been on the rise in accordance with the increase in Japanese national 
power.233 For example, entering the 21st century, Japan has wanted a new international 
and regional status and role suited for its power and to become qualified for the UN 
Security Council. However, it needed to amend the limitations of the constitution, such as 
the right to collective self-defense for its goal, and the Japanese conservative politicians 
began to push forward a variety of conservative policies such as the normalization.234 In 
addition, while Japan paid supporting funds of 13 billion dollars instead of dispatching 
forces in the Gulf War, it did not receive any gratitude from Kuwait or international 
society, and Japan began to have the perception that soft power cannot substitute for 
hard power.235 
Second, the Japanese conservative swing originates from the personal tendency of 
the postwar generation politicians. While the elder statesmen who experienced defeat in 
the Pacific War have feelings of wariness about the Japanese militarization, the postwar 
generation politicians do not share such a strong historical frame of reference as 
compared to the elder statesmen. 236  Moreover, Koizumi and Abe have quite a 
conservative tendency personally. Koizumi set forth a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as his 
election promise before he became the prime minister, and finally he made relations with 
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Japan’s neighbors worse by going ahead with the visit.237 Abe’s family has turned out 
members of the Lower House for three generations, including Abe, and Abe’s 
grandfather, Nobussuke Kishi, who was a mandarin during Japanese imperialism. 
Against this background, Abe has given positive aid to “the gathering making new 
history textbook,” established by the rightist nationalists since 1997. He also made 
officials amend the “Fundamentals of Education Act” toward emphasizing patriotism in 
2006 when he was prime minister for the first time, and he lined up a lot of conservative 
human resources.238 In addition, after he became prime minister for a second time, he let 
international society know the launch of the conservative regime by carrying out the visit 
to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013.239 
Third, Japan’s handling of war criminals was insufficient unlike Germany. In the 
case of Japan, the war criminals purged from public life in 1946 returned to the political 
world after the 1952 Treaty of San Francisco and led the founding of LDP in 1955. Like 
this, as the handling of war criminals was not fulfilled properly, it allowed the appearance 
of a revisionist historical view and the majority of the conservative forces.240 
Fourth, the anxiety and the loss of self-confidence that spread to Japanese society 
caused the conservative shift. Japan has entered long-term economic stagnation since the 
1990s, and its GDP was overtaken by China’s in 2010. This hurt the Japanese ego, and 
Japanese internal society began to demand strong political leadership. Thus, the 
nationalistic policies of the Japanese leadership have gained the support of the general 
public.241  
The last factor is the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance. After the end of the 
Cold War, the uselessness of the Japan-U.S. security system became apparent, and 
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frictions between the two countries developed in not only the economic sector but also 
the security sector. In addition, after the U.S. soldier’s rape of a citizen in Okinawa in 
1995, both countries grew concerned about the alliance and started to unwaveringly 
redefine the Japan-U.S. security system. Therefore, the Pentagon announced the “United 
States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region” at the instigation of Joseph 
Nye in February 1995 and emphasized the partnership between the United States and 
Japan and the Japan-U.S. security system. In addition, President Bill Clinton and Prime 
Minister Hashimoto announced the “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance 
for the 21st Century” at the summit talk in Tokyo in April 1996. Through this 
announcement of the joint declaration, the cooperation range of the Japan-U.S. security 
system has been expanded from the former Far East region to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Entering the 2000s, the Bush administration pursued outstandingly the strengthening of 
the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japanese role expansion, and the Koizumi administration and 
Abe administration also pursued the enhancement of the alliance and the diplomatic 
strategy that leaned toward the United States. Furthermore, as the “New Guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” was drawn up, the JSDF’s role increased flexibly 
according to the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and the activity range of 
the JSDF expanded to the Middle East after 9/11.242 
b. Conservative Politicians’ Policy Stance and Japanese Security Laws 
What exactly is the security policy stance of the Japanese conservative politicians 
in that conservative swing? First, they put emphasis on security cooperation with the 
United States through the Japan-U.S. alliance. The Japanese conservative forces think 
that the relationship with the United States should be prioritized rather than the 
relationship with other Asian states. At the regime’s launch, the Koizumi administration 
prioritized making conciliation number-one and put its utmost efforts into improving 
Japan’s relationship with the United States. For that, Koizumi indicated his favorable 
stance after his inauguration to the issue of the right of collective self-defense and the 
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MD development on which the United Stated looked positively. The Abe administration 
also has taken the strengthening of relationship with the United States as a pivot of its 
policy, and it has reinforced and reorganized the Japan-U.S. alliance by adapting for the 
U.S. global security strategy.243  
Next, Japanese conservative politicians have agreed with revision of the 
constitution and possession of the right of collective self-defense. They have taken a 
strong stand that Japan should permit every dimension of the right of self-defense as 
sovereignty of a state through amendment of Article 9 of the constitution, which denies 
conducting war, possessing formal military forces, and the right of belligerency. They 
also think that allowance of the right of collective self-defense and revision of the 
constitution are required for the Japan-U.S. genuine alliance.244  
The Japanese conservative politicians are agreed on overseas dispatch of the 
JSDF. In addition, they also pursue a hard-line and hawkish policy in the foreign policy 
toward North Korea. However, a lot of the conservative politicians, except for some far-
right politicians, still oppose nuclear-arming.245 
Under these policy stances, the Japanese conservative regimes have carried 
forward the amendment of the security laws in many ways. First, Japan promulgated the 
“Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas 
Surrounding Japan” in May 1999 as a domestic follow-up action to the “Japan–U.S. Joint 
Declaration on Security.” This act specified the supporting contents and process for the 
U.S. forces suppressing emergency situation surrounding Japan. However, it was 
criticized for being ambiguous about the “surrounding situation.” This ambiguity was in 
order to relieve the JSDF’s activity range from the specific area and support efficiently 
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the U.S. military. Moreover, even though the act limited the rear support for the U.S. 
forces to the noncombat operation, it also was criticized due to the suspicion that it would 
be actually obeyed.246  
In addition, entering the Koizumi administration, Japan carried out the 
implementation of the defense bill. The purpose of this legislation was to establish an 
active defense posture against armed attack. The defense bill consisting of the “Armed 
Attack Situation Response Law,” the “Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law,” and 
the “Establishment of the National Security Council Law,” was passed by the Diet by an 
overwhelming majority in May 2003. After the law was passed, neighboring countries 
such as Korea and China criticized it heavily claiming that Japan would abandon the 
principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy. The “Armed Attack Situation 
Response Law” contained the basic concept and procedure for how the Japanese 
government should handle an armed attack against Japan. By this law, Japan came to 
possess the capability and posture to conduct a self-defense war at least by enacting that 
the Prime Minister could order the move. Furthermore, the law expanded the concept of 
the “armed attack situation” from “the situation occurred the armed attack” to “the 
situation expected the armed attack.” The “Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law” 
newly stipulated the cooperating duty of the civilian sector for the JSDF’s smooth 
activity in an emergency. This law facilitated expropriation of private land or 
demolishing a house by the JSDF not only after the order for moving but also when the 
order for moving is expected. The “Establishment of the National Security Council Law” 
was to set up an expert committee consisting of the JSDF, the Ministry of Defense, the 
National Police Agency, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the National Security 
Council.247 
Entering the Abe administration, the amendment of the security laws emerged as 
key factor in Abe’s security and defense policy. Abe, who before planned to deepen the 
military alliance with the United States by conducting the right of collective self-defense 
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through the revision of the constitution, changed his direction to conduct the right of 
collective self-defense by only changing the interpretation of the constitution because the 
revision was not easy. Abe elicited the acceptance of the right of collective self-defense 
from the Diet in July 2014, and new Diet bills submitted in May 2015 took effect since 
March 29, 2016.248  
First, the Abe administration enacted the “Bill Concerning Cooperation and 
Support Activities and Other Activities to Armed Forces, of Foreign Countries and 
Others in Situations Where the International Community Is Collectively Addressing for 
Peace and Security.” According to this bill, Japan can send troops overseas whenever it is 
approved by the Diet without a special law.249 In addition, while Japan had admitted 
only the right of individual self-defense before the new defense bills, it legalized the right 
of collective self-defense by adding the new concept of “survival-threatening situations” 
through the overall amendment of the defense bills. Moreover, by the “Law Concerning 
Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an 
Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security” amended from the former “Law 
Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas 
Surrounding Japan” erased the expression of “surrounding Japan,” and the dispatch of 
troops and the use of armed force have become available under the decision of the 
Japanese Cabinet and Diet in the situation that can affect Japan seriously. Furthermore, 
the target of support has expanded from only the U.S. troops to any foreign military, and 
the activity range of the JSDF has extended to global. As a result, through these 
enactments and amendments of the security laws, free exercise of the JSDF has become 
possible without the revision of the constitution.250 
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2. JASDF’s Role Change and Strategic Evolution 
The strategic evolution of the JASDF conducted since the early 2000s also can be 
analyzed as a change to keep pace with the conservative swing of Japanese domestic 
politics and the changes of the various security laws. In a broad context, the JASDF’s 
evolving strategy is interpreted as an action to make an air force that meets the right of 
collective self-defense and the normalization of the JSDF. In other words, the JASDF’s 
evolving strategy is a way to alleviate the condition for use of force and expand the 
JSDF’s sphere of activity pursued by the Japanese conservative political powers. 
First, in terms of the change of JASDF’s strategic ends, the defense concept in the 
NDPG has evolved from the former “Basic Defense Capability” concept to the “Dynamic 
Defense Force” concept in the 2010 NDPG and the “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” 
concept in the 2013 NDPG, as mentioned in the former chapter. These changes are the 
basis of the evolution of the JSDF’s defense concept from defensive and passive repelling 
of an enemy’s intrusion into the Japanese mainland by minimum forces to achieving 
active deterrence by technically advanced joint forces and rapid neutralizing of the enemy 
when deterrence fails. And, in accordance with the changes of the defense concepts, the 
JASDF’s strategic ends also have evolved from the former exclusively defensive and 
passive objective of defending the mainland and airspace by air power to the active 
objective of possessing political and military deterrence capability supporting the 
“Dynamic Joint Defense Force” concept and flexible and rapid response capability. This 
change of the strategic ends has been affected by the Japanese conservative politicians’ 
normalization movement that Japan should exert the right of self-defense actively and 
possess necessary deterrence power as a sovereignty of state. In addition, through these 
changes in the JSDF’s defense concept and the JASDF’s strategic ends, Japan justifies 
the right of collective self-defense and strengthens the Japan-U.S. alliance by pursuing 
not only the peace and security of Japan but also contributing to regional security and 
world peace as the intention of the Japanese conservative regime.  
According to this evolving JASDF strategy, the JASDF’s strategic ways also have 
evolved. First, the JASDF has gradually accepted the air-to-ground strike operation 
concept, which was thoroughly excluded before, since the 2000s. Along with the 
 81
acquisition of the F-2 and F-35 air-to-ground fighter and JDAM air-to-ground precision 
guided bomb, the JASDF has been releasing the training of air-to-ground live bombs to 
the media since 2007. Furthermore, every time North Korea conducted a nuclear and 
missile test, some lawmakers of the LDP and officials of the Japanese Ministry of 
Defense advocated adoption of the preemptive strike concept against North Korean 
missile bases and acquisition of the means for it. This acceptance of the air-to-ground 
strike operation concept also is closely connected with the prosecution of normalization 
and securing of the right of collective self-defense embraced by Japanese conservative 
politicians. Conservative Japanese politicians seem to judge that the JSDF and the 
JASDF cannot act as a powerful sovereign nation if limiting itself to only the former 
passive air-to-air and surface-to-air operational concepts. Furthermore, they seem to 
believe that having air-to-ground capability would assure Japan could exercise the right 
of collective self-defense and also support practical cooperation with the United States in 
regional contingencies such as North Korea’s provocation or conflict with China. 
In this respect, the JASDF entering the 2000s introduced new various means. The 
F-2 fighter entered service in 2000, and a decision was made in 2011 to introduce the F-
35 fighter. The JDAM air-to-ground precision guided bomb acquired since 2003 
proceeded from the will of evolving into normal military. It also contributes to securing 
the right of collective self-defense by possessing the air-to-ground attack concept and air 
strike capability mentioned previously. Moreover, the JASDF has expanded the activity 
region from the Japanese mainland to East Asia and the world by introducing the KC-767 
aerial refueling tanker since 2006 and developing the C-2 long-distance cargo since 2007. 
Thus, it has taken steps to satisfy the willingness of Abe’s regime to justify the JSDF’s 
overseas dispatch and military intervention through the “Law Concerning Measures to 
Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” and the 
“Bill Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities and Other Activities to Armed 
Forces, of Foreign Countries and Others in Situations Where the International 
Community Is Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security.” In addition, Japan 
announced appeasement of the principle of the non-export of military arms in 2011 and 
carried out the full amendment of the principle in 2014 with the current normalization. 
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Through that, the next-generation fighter development project being developed by the 
Ministry of Defense gained momentum. The construction of a missile defense system 
through the acquisition of the BMD decided on by the Koizumi government has also been 
affected by the policy stance of the Japanese conservative regime that put emphasis on 
the Japan-U.S. alliance and security cooperation with the United States in terms of 
introducing the U.S. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system and the cooperative 
development of the next-generation intercept missile related with the MD.251 
D. INTRINSIC NATURE OF AIR STRATEGY FACTOR  
As examined previously, China’s military rise, North Korea’s threat, and the 
conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics have boosted the evolution of the 
JASDF’s strategy from the “defensive defense” strategy to an “offensive defense” 
strategy. However, why has the JASDF’s strategy evolved in an offensive direction, 
rather than a defensive direction? To answer this question, this subchapter argues that the 
evolution of the JASDF’s strategy has been affected by the intrinsically offensive nature 
of air strategy. In other words, even though the intrinsic nature of air strategy and air 
power is offensive, that nature has been repressed by the principle of an exclusively 
defense-oriented policy and Japan’s pacific constitution. However, China’s military rise, 
North Korea’s threat, and the conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics began to 
loosen those constraints, and the strategy of JASDF also began to incorporate the intrinsic 
nature of air power.  
1. Offensive Employment of Air Power in Modern Warfare 
After the appearance of the aircraft and aviation technology, air power became an 
indispensible force in modern warfare, and it has played a crucial role in victories during 
wars. Especially, national air forces have taken charge of the offensive role of aviation 
more than armies or navies. 
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Throughout the 20th century, the tangible importance of airpower in war 
outcomes was much debated. In the late 20th century, however, the development of 
precision guided weaponry shifted the terms of this debate. Since the Gulf War, the 
concept of air operation has changed toward attacking directly the enemy’s strategic 
center of gravity. In other words, countries in modern warfare have achieved their 
national goals and the political objectives through the offensive employment of air power 
by striking the enemy’s targets that are most directly and universally related to 
the enemy’s ability and will to resist and by minimizing contact with the enemy at 
the front.252  
In the first stages of the Gulf War, aircraft of the United States and the coalition 
forces began to strike against the main targets of Iraq. The air campaign of the Gulf War 
proceeded through four phases. In the first phase, the U.S. and coalition forces tried to 
paralyze Iraq’s command structure by destroying simultaneously the national command 
center, the command line, the Republican Guard, and so forth. In the second phase, the 
U.S. and coalition forces seized the air superiority by attacking Iraq’s SAM, AAA, and 
aircraft on the bases to remove and to deter the enemy’s air defense power in the Kuwait 
Theater of Operation. They destroyed Iraq’s battle capability through the attack against 
Iraq’s ground forces in the third phase, and they conducted the air strike against the 
Republican Guard to support the allied force’s ground operation in the fourth phase. The 
air strikes against the enemy’s strategic targets through the offensive employment of air 
power based on the stealth fighters and the precision guided munitions enabled coalition 
forces to seize the initiative and lead to early victory in the war.253    
In the Kosovo War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) excluded the 
employment of ground forces and won the war through only an offensive air campaign 
using high-tech air power. In the early phase of the air strike, NATO seized air 
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superiority by simultaneously intercepting Serbian aircraft in the air and striking the air 
bases and the air defense system on the ground. Furthermore, they weakened the enemy’s 
command and control system and attacked the Serbian force’s military targets and 
reinforcement forces and reduced Serbia’s war capability through air strikes against 
infrastructure facilities such as bridges, railroads, and the power grid. Milosevic had no 
choice but to surrender due to NATO’s offensive employment of the air power. As a 
result, the Kosovo War terminated by only the offensive air power without the ground 
forces.254  
The significance of the offensive employment of the air power was magnified also 
in the Afghanistan War following the Gulf War and the Kosovo War. Especially, the 
precision guided bombs such as the JDAM and the cave destruction weapons were used 
as about 60 percent of the total ammunitions to sweep the Taliban forces hiding in the 
mountainous areas, and the attack using UAVs was also conducted. Through the 
offensive air operation based on the precision guided bombing, the U.S. force 
experienced limited damage: only four dead, one bomber lost, and two helicopters lost.255 
The air strike operation of the U.S. and British allied force against Bagdad at the 
start of the Iraq War was conducted through three phases. In the first phase, the allied 
force conducted the precision air strike against the strategic targets in Bagdad, such as the 
palace of the President, the main military facilities, the air defense system, and the 
command and control system to reduce the command group’s will to resist and to isolate 
the military command. In the second phase, the allied force continued the air strike 
against strategic targets and conducted massive air attacks against communication 
facilities, intelligence facilities, broadcast stations, and the Iraq Republican Guard. In the 
third phase, the air operation was focused on the concentrated attacks against Bagdad and 
support to the stabilization operation of the ground forces. Also in the Iraq War, the air 
force took the initiative by neutralizing the enemy’s military power and strategy through 
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the early offensive employment of air power, and the neutralization of the enemy’s air 
defense system through the early air strike played a decisive role in air superiority in the 
theater. Especially, the air strike employing stealth fighters and bombers and the 
precision guided munitions against the enemy’s command and control system facilitated 
the early termination of the war by paralyzing the enemy physically and psychologically.  
Like these examples in war history, the effectiveness of the offensive employment 
of air power and the crucial role of the air power in the modern warfare support the 
arguments of the air strategy theorists concerning the intrinsically offensive nature of air 
power. With the advent of precision weaponry, these empirical lessons are increasingly 
reflected in the each country’s air force doctrine and operation concept. 
2. JASDF’s Self-Examination 
Despite the views and theories on air strategy mentioned earlier, after World War 
II the JASDF operated its air power according to an absolutely defensive strategy based 
on the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy and the pacific constitution. 
However, under the lessons from air war history, and especially in light of recent 
experiences showing the effectiveness of precisely guided munitions, doubt about the 
usefulness of the JASDF’s exclusively defensive strategy and self-examination began to 
appear also within JASDF after the early 2000s, and the necessity of a new strategy 
aligned with the intrinsically offensive nature of air power began to emerge.  
Kunio Orita, the former chief of the JASDF Air Development and Test Command 
and retired lieutenant general, argued in his article that soldiers should fathom and 
assimilate military techniques, strategies, and tactics appearing in modern warfare, and 
they should prepare for future war by interpreting modern war through past war.256 In 
this context, he elicited lessons of modern warfare from the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, 
the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War.  
Above all, he thought that modern warfare is conducted in the battlefield space 
that spatially expanded and time compressed, and the capability of power projection for 
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that battlefield space is essential in modern warfare.257 Like the early air strategy 
theorists, he argued that offense has become absolutely advantageous in modern warfare 
due to the disappearance of the obvious front line. In addition, he argued that even though 
Japan, surrounded by the sea, was in a hugely advantageous defensive position in times 
past, it could no longer rely on a defensive strategy because now Japan can be attacked 
anytime and anywhere due to the development of technology.258 Thus, he concluded that 
the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy pursued by Japan has no meaning 
in modern warfare because the victory of modern warfare is decided by the blow of air 
operation, and he preached the importance of securing air superiority and stand-off 
weapons and precision guided munitions.259 Orita’s article is meaningful in that he 
presented skepticism about the JASDF’s absolutely defensive strategy during his tenure 
as JASDF Air Development and Test Commander, and the article proposed that the 
JASDF’s strategy should evolve into a more offensive direction including long-distance 
power projection capability and air-to-ground strike capability.      
Moreover, Sugio Takahashi, a researcher in the National Institute for Defense 
Studies, put emphasis on the necessity of the JASDF’s air strike operation against the 
missile threats surrounding Japan by reviewing the effectiveness of the U.S. force’s air 
strike operations against enemy’s mobile missile launcher in the Gulf War and the Iraq 
War.260 In addition, he argued that constructing the composite system composed of the 
strike capability and the intercept system is more efficient in the defense budget than 
constructing only the intercept system.261 However, he claimed that Japan should 
possess the offensive capability in a way that can support U.S. strike operations such as 
aerial refueling capability and acquisition of precision guided weapons because Japan’s 
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independent strike capability against an enemy’s military bases under the principle of the 
exclusively defense-oriented policy can backfire for neighboring countries.262  
With these views of JASDF’s senior ranking officers and Japanese military 
experts, the JASDF established the JASDF Fundamental Doctrine under the supervision 
of the JASDF Doctrine Research Institute. Hiroshi Kameoka, a colonel of JASDF, stated 
that establishment of the JASDF Fundamental Doctrine was required because the need 
for presenting a basic concept of the JASDF’s action was recognized due to the change of 
patterns of warfare and the expansion of JSDF’s task, and the JASDF started basic 
research about the doctrine since 2005 and enacted the JASDF Fundamental Doctrine in 
March 2011.263 Though the details of the fundamental doctrine have not been opened to 
the public, the rough contents came out into the open in Japanese media reports in 2013. 
When a legislator of the Japan Communist Party in the meeting of the Lower House in 
2014 argued that the contents of JASDF’s Fundamental Doctrine conflict with the pacific 
constitution, a representative of Japan Ministry of Defense admitted the existence of the 
JASDF Fundamental Doctrine, and he stated that JASDF established the doctrine 
autonomously.264  
First, the JASDF Fundamental Doctrine is known to state that air power is the 
core of the joint strategy, and securing air superiority is the prerequisite for the entire 
joint strategy as proved in the Iraq War.265 In addition, it presents security assurance in 
the neighboring airspace, coping with the island attack, and the prevention of ballistic 
missile threats as the JASDF’s main operations, and it also states that for the main 
operations, the JASDF should prepare tactically offensive operations in cooperation with 
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the U.S. force.266 The doctrine has been criticized as violating the principle of an 
exclusively defense-oriented policy because the importance of offensive operation is 
emphasized by asserting the necessity of consideration about the strike capability 
against the enemy’s military bases and by specifying the advantage of offense and the 
disadvantage of defense.267  
As mentioned previously, the need for the more offensive strategy and the long-
distance power projection capability began to be recognized in the JASDF internally 
based on the lessons of air war history. Therefore, the JASDF carried forward the 
introduction of the air-to-ground operation concept in terms of the strategic ways, and it 
also acquired the air-to-ground fighter and the air-to-ground weapon for the air-to-ground 
operation and the aerial refueling tanker and the long-distance cargo for the long-distance 
power projection capability in terms of the strategic means. 
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IV. COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION 
This chapter makes a comprehensive evaluation by tabulating a scorecard for the 
drivers of the JASDF’s strategic evolution and measures which driver among the four 
independent variables has the biggest impact on the evolution of JASDF’s strategy. 
Moreover, this chapter defines the current JASDF strategy and anticipates the future 
JASDF strategy by analyzing the current trend of each independent variable. 
A. SCORECARD OF FACTORS 
The preceding chapter discussed the effect of four drivers on the evolution of the 
JASDF’s strategy: the modernization of the PLA’s air power, North Korea’s nuclear and 
missile threat, the conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics, and the intrinsically 
offensive nature of air power. This section summarizes the arguments and conclusions of 
the preceding chapter concerning how each of these factors affected the various aspects 
of the ends, the ways, and the means of JASDF’s strategy. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the modernization and the arms buildup of the 
PLA’s air power has affected the evolution of JASDF’s entire strategy. Japan’s threat 
perception in relation to the PLA’s modernization and military buildup has led to 
continuous changes in Japan’s defense concept after the early 2000s. In addition, the 
PLAAF’s pursuit of the “strategic air force,” the strengthening of the PLARF, and the 
aircraft carrier development of the PLAN has caused the need for the discussion about the 
air-to-ground capability and the preemptive strike operation concept in the JASDF and 
has brought about the force movement toward Okinawa and active air defense through 
vigorous scramble missions. Furthermore, for these changes, the JASDF acquired various 
aircraft such as the air-to-ground fighter, the aerial refueling tanker, and the AWACS and 
introduced the air-to-ground weapon required for the air strike operation. The JASDF is 
developing the fifth- and sixth-generation fighters that can respond to the PLAAF’s 
development of next-generation fighters and the modernization of air power, and it 
strengthened the air defense system that can counteract the Chinese missile forces.  
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North Korea’s nuclear and missile development also has affected the evolution of 
Japan’s defense concept by changing Japan’s threat perception against the surrounding 
security environment. Especially, the North Korean nuclear and missile threat has had 
one of the biggest impacts on the JASDF’s air-to-ground operation concept and the 
debate on the preemptive strike. Thus, it is analyzed that the JASDF’s acquisition of the 
air-to-ground fighter and the air-to-ground weapon supporting the JASDF’s new 
operation concept has been affected by North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. The 
strengthening of JASDF’s air defense system is also the means for defense against North 
Korea’s ballistic missiles. 
The conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics has strengthened the 
conservative politicians’ basic trend of security policy such as the amendment of the 
security laws, the securing of the right of collective self-defense, the strengthening of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance, and normalization through the revision of the constitution. Japan’s 
defense concept has evolved toward an assertive and active direction that can contribute 
to the conservative politicians’ policy stances. In addition, the acceptance of the air-to-
ground operation concept and the debate on the preemptive attack has been led by the 
hard-line right-wingers. The acquisitions of various weapon systems, which can be 
regarded as having offensive purpose, such as the air-to-ground fighter, the long-range 
cargo, and the air-to-ground weapon resulted from the conservative politicians’ pursuit of 
the right of collective self-defense and the normalization, and the development of the 
next-generation fighters got the driving force by the amendment of security laws. The 
strengthening of the JASDF’s air defense system in cooperation with the United States 
and the construction of the BMD system also has been affected by the seizure of power of 
the conservative politicians who have a pro-American tendency and assert the 
strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
It cannot be said that the offensive nature of the air strategy has affected the 
whole defense concept, including JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF. However, the 
profitableness of the offensive operation by air power came from theories on air strategy 
and lessons from air war history, which led to the demand for an air-to-ground operation 
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concept and debate on preemptive strikes, and it became a justification for the acquisition 
of the air-to-ground fighter, the aerial refueling tanker, and the air-to-ground weapon. 
Table 3 summarizes the preceding discussion by indicating whether each of the 
four major drivers produced a weak or a strong effect on the ends, ways, and means of 
JASDF’s evolving strategy since the 1990s. 




















Modernization S S S S S S S S 
N.K. 
Nuclear/Missile S S W W S S W S 
Conservative 
Swing S S W W S S S S 
Air Power 
Nature W S W W S S W W 
S: Strong or W: Weak 
Therefore, analyzing from the scorecard tabulated in Table 3, the evolution of the 
JASDF’s strategy since the early 2000s from the “defensive defense” strategy to the 
“offensive defense” strategy was a combined result of the modernization and the arms 
buildup of the PLA’s air power, the growth of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, 
the conservative swing of the Japanese domestic politics, and the intrinsically offensive 
nature of air power. In other words, under the situation that required a response to the 
changing external environment given by the increase of the Chinese and North Korean 
threats, the traditional principles of Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented security policy 
and pacific constitution have been broken. This break corresponds with the policy stance 
of the conservative politicians predominant in Japanese domestic politics, and in this 
process, the intrinsically offensive nature of the JASDF’s strategy, which was suppressed 
by the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, began to come out. Figure 7 
illustrates this development. 
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Figure 7.  Concept of Relationship among the Four Independence Variables 
 
However, from the detailed analysis about the effects of each independent 
variable on the JASDF’s evolving strategy, displayed in Table 3, among the four 
independent variables, the modernization and the arms buildup of the PLA’s air power 
has had the greatest effect on this evolution. Other factors mainly have affected the air-to-
ground operation concept, the air-to-ground fighter and the air-to-ground weapon 
supporting that concept, and the acquisition of the means that strengthen the long-
distance power projection capability. But the Chinese threat factor has affected all 
elements of the JASDF’s strategic change, including the JASDF’s goal, the air-to-ground 
operation concept, the movement of forces, the aggressive intercept activity, the various 
acquisitions of fighters and weapons, the development of next-generation fighters, and 
the strengthening of the air defense system. 
B. JASDF’S CURRENT AND FUTURE STRATEGY 
As analyzed so far, JASDF’s strategy since the early 2000s has evolved from the 
former “defensive defense” strategy to the “offensive defense” strategy. Given the 
ongoing and interacting roles of the modernization of the PLA’s air power, North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile threat, the conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics, and the 
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intrinsically offensive nature of air strategy, how might JASDF’s strategy evolve in the 
future? To anticipate the future evolution of JASDF’s strategy, it is necessary to examine 
the current trend of the aforementioned four independent variables. 
First, Chinese air power and Japanese air power are clashing continuously due to 
the East China Sea issue. Especially, after China’s announcement of a CADIZ above the 
East China Sea in 2013, tension has been growing between both countries’ fighters. It 
was controversial that the PLAAF’s fighters and the JASDF’s fighters, which were 
dispatched to the East China Sea for the scramble mission, committed an act of 
aggression mutually in June 2016.268 While it was common practice previously to keep 
each other in check at a distance when both countries’ fighters encounter one another in 
the air, at the time, the fighters posed a threat to each other by using infra-red jamming 
and fire control radar extraordinarily.269 In addition, China contracted with Russia in 
November 2015 to introduce 24 Su-35 fighters by 2018, and four Su-35 fighters will be 
delivered in 2016 and will be used for securing air superiority in the East China Sea and 
the South China Sea.270 Furthermore, the PLAAF conducted large-scale military training 
in which about 40 aircraft participated including H-6 bombers, Su-30 fighters, and aerial 
refueling tankers on September 25, 2016, and JASDF’s fighters were rushed out to 
conduct a combat air patrol.271 As before, the clash and tension between both countries’ 
air power has been occurring continuously.  
Second, North Korea is continuously pursuing technology advancement of missile 
and nuclear forces, such as miniaturization and lightening of the nuclear weapon, 
increasing the range and accuracy of the ballistic missile, and developing the SLBM. 
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Furthermore, as North Korea’s missiles launched recently for a test fell in the Japanese 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Japanese degree of fear of North Korea’s missile 
threat has increased further. One of the two Rodong Missiles launched for test on August 
3, 2016, exploded shortly after liftoff, but the other flew about 1,000 km and fell in the 
Japanese EEZ for the first time. The SLBM launched on August 24, 2016, also flew 
about 500 km and dropped into the sea 80 km inside of the JADIZ.272 See Figure 8. 
Figure 8.  Major Ballistic Missile Launches by North Korea in 2016273 
 
Third, the superiority of conservative political power and deepening of the 
conservative swing is expected to continue for the time being. Through the Japanese 
Upper House election in July 2016, the ruling coalition of the LDP and the Komeito 
secured 146 seats, 60.3 percent of the 242 seats in the Diet, and more than two-thirds of 
the total Upper House has been occupied by the members in favor of the revision of the 
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constitution.274 As a result, the ruling coalition, which already secured more than two-
thirds majority in the Lower House, can push ahead with revision of the constitution in 
the Diet after the election.  
Lastly, the intrinsically offensive nature of the air strategy would be unchangeable. 
Air power’s intrinsic characteristics, such as speed, flexibility, and ubiquity, and the fact 
that defense is not advantageous because obstacles and fortifications do not exist in the 
air would be valid until the appearance of innovative weapons that can overcome the 
nature of air power. Thus, air power in future conflicts and war also would operate under 
the offensive strategy, operation, and tactics like as it has until now. Moreover, even 
though the JASDF has established only the fundamental doctrine so far, if the JASDF 
makes subordinate doctrines in the future, the future doctrines also would contain 
offensive operation concepts and expressions deviating from the principle of an 
exclusively defense-oriented policy due to the intrinsic nature of air power—despite 
political opponents and public criticism.     
Therefore, from the analysis of the current trend of the four independent variables, 
it is anticipated that the JASDF’s strategy in the future also is likely to continue evolving 
toward the direction of solidifying and completing the “offensive defense” strategy that 
began in the early 2000s. For this evolution, the JASDF might push forward defense 
policies supplementing the weak points of the current “offensive defense” strategy in 
the future.  
Above all, it seems that the weakest capability of the current JASDF “offensive 
defense” strategy is the air-to-ground weapon. Japan has acquired the air-to-ground 
fighter platforms such as the F-2 and F-35 and has possessed long-distance power 
projection capability through the aerial refueling tanker. However, for independent 
counter-strike ability and support missions within U.S.-Japan security cooperation, the 
JASDF might need more diverse and stronger air-to-ground weapons besides the current 
JDAM kit. In addition, for the autonomous “offensive defense” strategy, the JASDF is 
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likely to consider acquisition of electronic warfare aircraft required for the counter-strike 
phase, which it now lacks. Thus, it is necessary to pay attention to whether the JASDF 
pushes forward the acquisition of these weapon systems. Deployment of extensive air-to-
ground weapons and electronic warfare aircraft would indicate that the JASDF is 
evolving from the former U.S.-Japan security cooperation-oriented strategy to a more 
independent “offensive defense” strategy. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Entering the 2000s, many changes appeared not only in the JASDF but in the 
whole of the JSDF. Especially, the military buildup and the changes in strategy that 
deviated from the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, the basic stance of 
the Japanese defense policy, and the pacific constitution began to emerge, and 
neighboring countries have assessed that Japan began to break from the principle of an 
exclusively defense-oriented policy. Some have even expressed extreme concern that 
Japan is going back to its past militarism. It is a common phenomenon that Korean and 
Chinese internal public opinion casts aspersion on Japanese far-right politicians such as 
Koizumi and Abe as criticism of JSDF’s change. 
This thesis focused on the JASDF and first tried to determine whether the 
JASDF’s strategy is actually changing, and in what direction JASDF’s strategy is 
evolving if it is actually changing. The first conclusion of this thesis is that JASDF’s 
strategy has evolved from the former “defensive defense” strategy to an “offensive 
defense” strategy since the early 2000s. To reach this conclusion, this thesis first 
examined the change in JSDF’s defense concept to analyze the JASDF’s strategic ends. 
Like other countries’ army, navy, and air force, the JGSDF, the JMSDF, and the JASDF 
decide their own strategic objectives and policies on the basis of one military objective, 
which comes from the national objective. In Japan’s case, the military objective is 
inherent in the defense concept specified in the NDPG. Japan’s defense concept has 
evolved from the former “Basic Defense Capability” concept to the “Dynamic Defense 
Force” concept and the “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” concept. Under these changes, 
the ends of the JASDF’s strategy have evolved from the former absolutely defensive and 
passive ends of using air power to defend against an enemy invading the Japanese 
mainland, to active and aggressive ends of creating a favorable political and military 
situation by possessing deterrence capability and repelling ability against the surrounding 
threats through the construction of rapid, flexible, and dynamic air forces.  
The most meaningful change in the JASDF’s strategy occurred in strategic ways, 
as the air-to-ground operation concept, which was absolutely excluded before, began to 
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be accepted, and the debate about preemptive strike capability started internally. While 
the former operation concept of the JASDF was composed of only the air-to-air operation 
concept and limited ground support operation, the JASDF began to take on the air-to-
ground operation concept and air-to-ground trainings entering 2000s. In addition, the 
JASDF carried forward the relocation and movement of air forces, and it has conducted 
scramble missions aggressively since the early 2000s.  
In terms of the JASDF’s strategic means, a variety of weapon systems have been 
acquired to support the JASDF’s strategic ends and ways described previously. Above all, 
advanced air-to-ground fighters, such as the F-2 and F-35 and the JDAM precision 
guided air-to-ground weapon that actualize the JASDF’s incorporation of the air-to-
ground operation concept have been introduced, and the aerial refueling tankers and long-
distance cargo began to be purchased and developed to secure the long-distance power 
projection capability. In addition, AWACSs and UAVs have been introduced to 
strengthen surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning activity surrounding the Japanese 
mainland. Moreover, Japan is developing autonomously the fifth- and sixth-generation 
fighters, and it has strengthened the air defense system composed of the intercept missiles 
and the air defense radars based on the BMD system constructed in cooperation with the 
United States.  
To define this evolution of JASDF’s strategy, this thesis used Korean scholar 
Jaeyeop Kim’s concepts of “defensive defense” and “offensive defense.” Even though 
both concepts fall under defense strategy in the big picture, the differences between the 
two strategic concepts include the objective of war, the pursued battle space, the effort of 
counter-offensive, and the pursued period of war. According to these concepts, this thesis 
concluded that the JASDF’s strategy entering the 2000s has evolved from the former 
“defensive defense” strategy to the “offensive defense” strategy. 
The second conclusion of this thesis is that the evolution of the JASDF’s strategy 
is a combined result of the four drivers: modernization and buildup of the PLA’s air 
power on the basis of China’s rise, the increase of North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
threat, the conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics, and the intrinsically 
offensive nature of air strategy and air power. The PLAAF has carried forward the 
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modernization and arms strengthening since the middle of the 1990s, and that effort 
became a reality in the construction of “strategic air force” since the early 2000s. The 
PLARF has acquired various ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and the PLAN 
developed and employed an aircraft carrier. North Korea began to develop a nuclear 
weapon since the 1990s and emerged an actual nuclear power, and it has placed the 
Japanese mainland within the firing range by developing a variety of ballistic missiles. 
These threats from China and North Korea are the external factors that affected the 
JASDF’s evolving strategy.  
In this security environment, the rightist leaders and the LDP politicians holding 
power in Japanese politics for the long term have pushed forward amendments to the 
security laws and revision of the constitution in accordance with their policy stance. This 
conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics has acted as an internal factor affecting 
JASDF’s evolving strategy. Lastly, air strategy theories and air war history indicate that 
air power is effective when it is operated offensively. As a result, the voices of self-
examination began to be heard within JASDF thinking in accordance with the lessons of 
air war history, and the JASDF seems to be evolving toward the “offensive defense” 
strategy under this self-examination movement.  
Even though JASDF’s evolving strategy is a combined result of these four 
independent variables, the third conclusion of this thesis is that the most influential driver 
of JASDF’s strategic evolution is China’s rise and the modernization and military buildup 
of the PLA’s air power. This conclusion emerges from the preceding detailed analysis 
and is summarized in the scorecard in the previous chapter.   
The analysis suggests that the JASDF may strengthen its “offensive defense” 
strategy in the future due to the current relationship between China and Japan and the 
clash of air power in the East China Sea, the continued growth of North Korea’s nuclear 
and missile threat, the strengthening influence of conservative political power in Japan, 
and the growing attention to the intrinsically offensive nature of air power in the JASDF. 
In addition, because the weakest element of the JASDF’s current “offensive defense” 
strategy seems to be the air-to-ground weapon, an early indicator of Japanese strategic 
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thinking will be whether the JASDF introduces new air-to-ground weapons in the future, 
and what kind of weapons the JASDF acquires.   
What should be kept in mind is that the JASDF’s strategy is evolving toward the 
“offensive defense” strategy, not the “offense” strategy. It is a fact that the JASDF has 
been acquiring a variety of offensive weapons and long-distance power projection 
capabilities in terms of strategic ways and means, and neighboring countries are 
concerned that these trends indicate increasing Japanese militarism.  
However, in light of the current strategic ends of the JASDF, these strategic ways 
and means still can be interpreted to support the defensive objective of maintaining the 
status quo rather than the offensive objective of expanding territory or pursuing 
hegemony in the region. Thus, the opinion that the JASDF’s evolving strategy and the 
JSDF’s changes are the precursors of a new militarism and imperialism in Japan 
is an overinterpretation.   
Still, realists’ balance of threat theory says that one country’s expansion of 
offensive capabilities can be regarded as a threat to its neighboring countries, and 
neighboring countries pursue balancing against that expansion. 275  This balancing 
appears with external alliance or internal military buildup. Therefore, the evolution of the 
JASDF’s strategy toward the “offensive defense” strategy can be a driver to cool 
relationships and accelerate an arms race in Northeast Asia, and the region can become 
more unstable in the future despite Japan’s pursuit of status quo. It is a classic security 
dilemma.   
If the most influential driver of the JASDF’s strategic evolution is the 
modernization of the PLA’s air power, as the analysis of this thesis has indicated, it is 
likely that Northeast Asia’s security environment in the future would be governed by the 
relationship between Japan and China, the two dominant powers in the region, and their 
perception of each other. Especially, recent military incidents between the two countries, 
such as the tense encounter of fighters in the East China Sea, can push both countries’ 
strategies toward more offensive directions, and this can escalate into an arms race 
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between not only these two countries but all of Northeast Asia. Therefore, Japan and 
China should develop various channels for communication to prevent escalation and 
military clashes in dangerous situations. Furthermore, peaceful and rational solutions 
for territorial disputes and historical tensions, which are among the causes of the 
clashes related to both countries’ national interest, should be created politically and 
diplomatically. 
In addition, the thesis shows that North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat and the 
conservative swing of Japanese domestic politics are also driving JASDF’s strategy in the 
direction of offensive defense. In particular, North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat is 
acting as a serious threat to not only Japan but also all neighboring countries, influencing 
neighboring countries’ national strategy and military strategy as well. Thus, to prevent 
the arms race in Northeast Asia, multilateral security cooperation plans for the solution to 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue should be pursued by the countries in the 
Northeast Asia region, including the Republic of Korea, the United States, Japan, China, 
Russia, and Taiwan. Moreover, Japanese conservative politicians should avoid far-right 
policies and bills that can stimulate surrounding countries, and they should make 
diplomatic efforts for explaining their policies to neighboring countries. 
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